

Non-Mediated Peacekeeping: The Case of Israeli–Palestinian Security Cooperation

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The Joint Patrols (JP) and the District Coordination Offices (DCO) succeeded to stabilize, rather than destabilize the Oslo period through their formal and informal structures. Great efforts were made to ensure the success of this unprecedented experiment in ‘non-mediated peacekeeping,’ despite contradictory political forces and primitive organizational management that undermined if not directly opposed their work. Although many problems existed on the ground, particularly on the Joint Patrols, security cooperation was nevertheless a sign of hope, a mechanism for the continuous flow of information, a strategy to reduce tensions in the field, a technique to develop working relations of trust and a means to build shared professional standards for future relations. Two choices can be made vis-à-vis the Joint Patrols for a future peace process and military security cooperation. One, is to disband them. The other, is to make them more sophisticated and capable to support adaptive change.

There are many kinds of people. Half of the Palestinians want the peace process like half the Israelis want the peace process. But when one Israeli soldier who is not in favor of the peace process, when he comes *here* and works with us . . .when they come *here* (he beams possessively with a smile and light in his eyes). You see, it is not just the technical work, it is working together. How to let the Palestinian people go to the safe side.

Nadim, Palestinian DCO Officer. Tulkarem, 1997

In September 1997 the Oslo Agreements¹ had been in full swing for four years. Social and political tensions, intensified by conflict, violence and political extremism were marked by key events and policies, including the assassination of Itzhak Rabin (5 November 1995), election of right-wing politician Benjamin Netanyahu as Prime Minister of Israel, a steady rate of Palestinian terror and suicide attacks, rampant corruption within the Palestinian National Authority and the growth of Israeli settlements and bypass roads. Yet throughout this period there was a constant and continuous peacekeeping and peacebuilding effort. The Oslo Agreements had created a security cooperation mechanism structured and outlined by contract and signed by both Israeli and Palestinian sides. ‘Former enemy’ fighters worked daily to maintain law and order within the ‘transitional space’² between Israel and the Palestinian entity. Only one security instrument operated in public

view as a symbol of peace and hope that co-existence and equality were possible. These were the Israeli-Palestinian 'Joint Patrols.'

From May 1994 through October 2000, Palestinian and Israeli military-trained men, armed and side-by-side, were assigned a constabulary role to keep the peace and protect their respective 'citizens.' In what Israeli and Palestinian military men described as a 'bubble,' insulated and detached from the surrounding military operations, the Joint Patrols enforced an alliance. They persisted over a six-year period, from 1994 until they were disbanded in October 2000.³ Two jeeps, one Israeli and one Palestinian, traversed the interim borders and translated political cooperation into security coordination. Joint Patrols were designed as a 'confidence building measure'.⁴ They institutionalized an innovative experimental form of peacekeeping, a mechanism that may be assigned the name 'non-mediated peacekeeping' where no third-party mediated, interfered, moderated or facilitated the daily working relations of this unique peacekeeping/peacebuilding organ. From September 1997 to September 2000 an ethnographic study was launched to examine the negotiation of their daily relations and the transformation of fighters to peacekeepers.

The chapter has two main objectives: one, to name the formal security cooperation mechanism performed by Israelis and Palestinians as 'non-mediated peacekeeping,' and two, to examine how daily informal relations reproduced the root causes of the conflict, i.e. the struggle over resources and identity. The chapter begins with a brief historical setting of the conflict followed by an outline of the Oslo Accords vis-à-vis its allocation of territory and sovereignty and the formal arrangements and structure of security cooperation. In order to identify the relationship between peacekeeping and 'non-mediated peacekeeping' relevant peacekeeping research and themes will be applied to Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation. Finally, a brief demographic sketch of the social actors enables the examination of a central mechanism that sustained the impossible mission: The management and negotiation of emotions. Details will be drawn from my fieldwork to illuminate these points.⁵

It should be stated at the outset, that the ethnographic study supported the following conclusion: 'non-mediated peacekeeping' worked successfully. During the Oslo period the social experiment reduced violence and served to stabilize a politically indecisive and volatile period. The ongoing relationship between occupier-occupied and the political indecisiveness to forge and/or accept viable permanent boundaries created an impossible situation. What failed and eventually destroyed the Oslo period was not faulty security cooperation at the field level but the impotence of political leadership to guide their respective populations towards adaptive change – an analysis that I will not pursue here. Despite, or perhaps because of, these

conditions the experiment was a remarkable test of adaptability, resolve and commitment towards peacebuilding.

Theoretical Background

Current concerns among military sociologists researching peacekeeping over the past decade have spanned a variety of perspectives and theoretical approaches.⁶ Kernic identifies relevant sociological perspectives to the preparation of soldiers for a peacekeeping mission as negotiations skills, intercultural communication skills and the appreciation of cultural diversity.⁷ Yet a paucity of research exists that draws upon the nuanced complexity of intercultural interaction and communication possibly because ethnographic research does not tend to be the methodology of choice in the research and analysis of peacekeeping.

The present analysis of ‘non-mediated peacekeeping’ uses theory that illuminates the negotiation of symmetry. Drawing from Bourdieu’s concept of field, security cooperation has been conceptualized within a theatrical frame where social actors struggled over specific resources, stakes and access to them. As Bourdieu notes, the primary dynamics of a ‘field’ resides in ‘the form of its structure and, in particular, in the distance, the gaps, the asymmetries between the various specific forces that confront one another’⁸. Maneuvering the ‘field’ requires the ability to improvise and acknowledge the ‘rules of the game.’ In the example of the Joint Patrols, the struggle to realign relations of power occurred at the micro-level of daily contact. The question was how did the men adapt to the challenge, manage the rules of the game and maintain working relations?

I will reason, as stated above, that the negotiation of power revealed a primary work task to be the management of emotion. As such, the struggle over symmetry focused attention onto resources tied to moral sentiments. Honor, fear, anger, distrust, warmth were negotiated through various resources. The color of a bulletin board, the height of a flag, the willingness to handshake, the consideration to place a telephone call, graciously offer a cigarette or carefully pour a cup of coffee could create or destroy the social glue that supported working relations. Desires and incentives became mobilizing forces that dictated whether the men chose to prevent rocks from being thrown, provide information about illicit activities, permit access to public or private spaces, place a checkpoint out of view from spectators or cooperate during working hours. Symbolic capital, as Bourdieu recognized, is the domain where moral sentiments of prestige and honor are allocated as a consequence of economic, cultural and social resources.⁹ Symbolic capital reveals ‘categories of perception’ that derive from their own specific logic.¹⁰ This logic I found to be located within the unique ways Palestinian and

Israeli military men made sense of their daily practice and saw themselves as men at work.

Formal Security Cooperation

Historical Setting

The Israeli–Palestinian conflict has been aptly categorized within the general status of international relations theory as a ‘deep-rooted conflict’.¹¹ ‘Deep-rooted conflicts’ involve struggles over basic needs, rather than positions or allegedly rational interests.¹² Such conflicts are characterized by inequality, the denial of identity and the absence of security to pursue one’s culture and cultural life.

Much has been written on the Palestinian–Israeli conflict¹³ that tends to support the following two, deep-rooted themes – land and national identity. The fight for control of Palestine/the land of Israel – a contested domain between Jews and Arabs – and the resistance to a Jewish state within the center of the Muslim Arab world framed the multiple encounters on the Joint Patrols as a clash between two nationalisms, one Zionist and the other Arab/Palestinian. Their respective histories resulted in vast cultural and historical disparities between the two populations of military policemen but the daily negotiation of relations also bracketed their work within an asymmetric field of struggle to reaffirm subjective claims of ownership. Palestinian narratives constituted their authentic and superior position as true natives and the Israeli Zionists as foreign, colonialists. The contrasting Israeli narratives conceptualized Zionism as a return to their homeland, a homeland, which they had neither left – despite Crusades and Muslim conquests – nor forgotten.

Compounding the narratives, migrations, immigrations and pain fueled the flames of the conflict. Jewish suffering and dispersions¹⁴ met Palestinian suffering and dispersion.¹⁵ Palestinian anguish and Jewish suffering framed grief and ownership as integral forces behind the struggle to shift the balance of power both in terms of material resources and moral sentiments. Israeli Joint Patrolmen faced the Palestinian narrative that identified the creation of Israel as the source of Palestinian agony. In Rashid Khalidi’s words, Israel left the entity Palestine to vanish and 750,000 of 1.4 million Palestinians to become a ‘refugee problem . . . (who) disappeared from the world stage as a people . . . losing their voice to the Arab regimes’.¹⁶

The dispersion of Palestinian communities was the result of the first Arab–Israeli war in 1948. The ‘catastrophe’ or *Al Nakba*¹⁷ created Palestinian refugees who settled throughout the world, particularly in the Arab countries. The great majority of Christian Palestinians fled to the West. Communist bloc

countries also provided havens and education for select refugees. They received support in medical and other professional training. Others gained knowledge and skill through military training, which Palestinian fighters also gained in the Arab countries such as Yemen, Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt. When the Palestinian political leadership and paramilitary force returned after the signing of 'Oslo I'¹⁸ in May 1994, many spoke Spanish, Russian and German, which they had learned in Cuba, Russia and East Germany respectively. Indeed, during my fieldwork, I spoke Spanish with the Palestinian DCO commander in Ramallah and German with the commander in Tulkarem. 'Outsiders' who had lived abroad had no direct memories of life under occupation but they also lacked the positive and negative experiences of their local counterparts who had years of direct contact with Israelis. Within the Palestinian controlled territories established by the Oslo Agreements a tug-of-war between 'insiders' and 'outsiders' for power and control created a persistent undercurrent of tensions within the Palestinian community. Virtually all senior positions within the Palestinian National Authority including positions within the organization of security cooperation were fulfilled by Palestinian 'outsiders.'

But while the Palestinian 'catastrophe' occurred in 1948 and created two communities of Palestinian 'insiders' and 'outsiders,' Jewish communities had dispersed for thousands of years after numerous catastrophes. From the time of the destruction of the first Temple in 586BCE and again with the destruction of the Second Temple in 70AD, centuries of dispersions, expulsions and persecutions established divergent Jewish communities throughout the world until the establishment of the State of Israel. The development of Zionism in the late nineteenth and twentieth century brought European Jews to Palestine who would forge the political and economic infrastructure of the new State of Israel. During the Ottoman Empire and then British Mandate period the 'coming up' or *Aliyah*¹⁹ of European Jews found indigenous Jewish communities living in the land – primarily in Jerusalem, Hebron, Safed and Tiberias.

The holocaust of European Jewry during World War II, left survivors to immigrate only after the British Mandate terminated in 1947 and they were followed by the next large immigration from the Arab world. In the 1950s, two years after the creation of the Jewish State, Arab states expelled their centuries-old Jewish communities and hundreds of thousands of Jews fled from Arab lands. The Arab Jews changed the Jewish demography of the 1950s. Arab Jews, European Jews (including those who came from South America, North America, South Africa and Australia) and the small indigenous Jewish population created the fledgling Israeli Jew. They were later met in the 1980s and 1990s with Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union and Ethiopia who increased the non-homogeneous

demographics of Israel's Jewish communities. The impact of demographic mixtures directly affected the work of security cooperation for newly immigrated Ethiopian and Russian Jews mixed with Middle Eastern and European Israelis – both Jews and non-Jews²⁰ creating a complex composite of military policemen on the Israeli Joint Patrols.

The consequence of migrations and in-gatherings, expulsions, wars and return to the land positioned Jewish Israelis and Muslim Palestinians on the Joint Patrols to contend with the post-colonial struggle over 'the meaning of borders and the tortured politics of belonging'.²¹ Their work coalesced grief and ownership, identity and sovereignty that pitted the foreign against the authentic, natural order of things. Joint patrolling enacted and re-enacted the struggle over material and affective attachments to secure the authority of entitlement. The Zionist notion 'to redeem the land' confronted the Palestinian call for property rights.

Oslo Accords: Creating Asymmetry by Contract

On September 12 1993 the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements was signed in Washington, DC. It was to signify a new page in Israeli–Palestinian relations, a compromise that was ostensibly to result in an exchange of land for peace and a two-state solution. To support the transition period, a set of collaborative structures were established, including military and security cooperation. Eight months later on 4 May 1994, 'Oslo I' – the Cairo agreement – was signed. On 28 September 1995 over a year after the signing of Oslo I, and six months from the first Joint Patrol operations, 'Oslo II' was signed in Washington. The 'Israeli–Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip' further outlined and specified the procedures for 'the coordination and cooperation in mutual security matters'.²² 'Oslo II' expanded the domain of security cooperation throughout the West Bank.

Thus the 'Oslo Agreements' – a term to loosely describe all three agreements, only one of which was actually negotiated in Oslo, Norway²³ – cut up the West Bank into three areas: A, B, and C. Area A, which consisted of approximately 2 per cent of the West Bank, provided full civil and security control to the Palestinian (National) Authority.²⁴ Area B allocated full civil control to the Palestinian Authority but not in matters that Israel determined security-related. In other words, Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Border Police had access to Area B to meet security needs. Area C was under Israel's full jurisdiction for both civil and security matters.

The primary military purpose of the Joint Patrols on the West Bank was to enable an Israeli security presence within Area A. Albeit escorted by the Palestinian jeep, the Israel military was fully responsible for Israeli citizens everywhere throughout the West Bank and thus able to remove, constrain or

simply manage situations that arose for Israeli citizens who were inside the bounds of cities under full Palestinian sovereignty. In other words, the negotiation of trust and building of mutual confidence were primary sub-texts to the security cooperation project that determined future security practices. Ground rules and a security infrastructure were established in order to approximate a relationship of equivalence between professional military men.

JSC – RSC – DCO – Joint Patrols

The Oslo Accords created a well-structured security cooperation apparatus that assigned an equal number of Israeli and Palestinian military professionals to man senior security cooperation positions. At the most senior level, the Joint Coordination and Cooperation Committee for Mutual Security Purposes (JSC) was established as the legal and formal body that would deal ‘with the issue of persons who are present in the areas in violation of this Agreement’.²⁵ Two senior commanders, one Israeli and one Palestinian filled the role. The Israeli JSC commander sat in Tel Aviv and the Palestinian JSC Commander in Gaza. Each side had between five and seven officers and all decisions would be reached by mutual agreement. Meetings were scheduled every two weeks. The Agreement formalized a timetable where, should the need arise or the request be made, a meeting ‘shall be convened within forty-eight hours’.²⁶ To intensify the cooperative spirit, meetings were alternately hosted unless otherwise agreed upon by the two sides.

Two Regional Security Committees (RSCs) guided their respective District Coordination Office (DCO) on security policy guidelines. The agreements outlined that DCO commanders would refer security issues to the RSC in order to ensure the proper transfer of information and policy guidelines. Israeli and Palestinian RSCs were legally bound to maintain contact through ‘regular as well as special meetings . . . held between the commander of the Israeli military forces and the commander of the Palestinian Police in the West Bank or in the Gaza Strip, as appropriate.’ The office would be required to operate 24-hours a day ‘with direct and constant communication links between the two sides’.²⁷

Ten DCOs – two in Gaza and eight in the West Bank – were under the command of their respective RSC branch and directly responsible for the Joint Patrols. The eight DCOs in the West Bank were created to supervise eight Palestinian districts: Jenin, Nablus, Tulkarm, Kalkilieh, Ramallah, Bethlehem, Hebron and Jericho, roughly 2 per cent of the West Bank. These districts were identified as Area A under the PA’s complete civil and security control. Two DCO offices, already established in 1994 by Oslo I, were located at the Erez crossing and the other for the Khan Yunis district, located at the Nuriya Camp.

The DCO consisted of military barracks constructed either on the ‘border’ between Areas B or C and A, or entirely in Areas B or C. Barbed wire fences

surrounded the DCO complex and access to the compound was strictly guarded. Inside the compound, Palestinian and Israeli areas were accessible through an open gate flanked by Palestinian and Israeli flags.²⁸ DCO personnel consisted of a team of up to six commissioned officers from each side respectively who were required to continuously staff the compound. Their sole purpose was to fulfill the Oslo Agreement, maintain the diplomatic and peaceful relations between their men and contain the forces of tension and resistance in the field. They were assigned to monitor all matters of a joint nature specifically the operation of the Joint Patrols.

The Joint Patrols consisted of two jeeps, one Israeli and one Palestinian, manned by armed military police that together patrolled the main streets of eight Palestinian cities on the West Bank and two seams along the Gaza Strip. The mandate of their joint mission was 'to assist in ensuring free, unimpeded, and secure movement along the roads designated' in the agreement for the men, women and children who lived, worked or traveled in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.²⁹ They were not established as an observer force, but a force to be observed by Israeli and Palestinian citizens as a symbol of co-existence and a tool to facilitate a shift in power relations. Furthermore, unlike the TIPH,³⁰ the Temporary International Presence in Hebron, their mission was to actively intervene in any incident or dispute that would occur between Israeli and Palestinian citizens in order to maintain security for all the citizens.

Joint Patrols were jointly commanded by Israeli and Palestinian DCO commanders, but each jeep was under the command of their respective commanding officers. Together, they decided where and when the Joint Patrols would meet, who would examine a problem between Israeli and Palestinian citizens or how to manage an incident of mutual concern. As the higher authority, the DCO commanders most frequently solved work-related problems. DCO commanders were often responsible for coordinating the two sides during rock-throwing incidents or more volatile incidents, such as Al Nakba demonstrations. DCO commanders also managed relationship-related problems between the Joint Patrolmen or Jeep Commanders in the field. Tensions, provocations, name-calling and violence occurred between the men on the Joint Patrols.

Jointly organized and mediated conflict resolution sessions were called generally every two months or earlier if the need arose. Gatherings alternated between the Israeli or Palestinian side of the DCO complex or in the Joint Briefing or Operations room. Wherever meetings convened, the men found themselves crowded together in a room. Joint Patrol Jeep Commanders and DCO officers sat side by side to discuss problems and manage crises. I refer here to conflicts that spanned a spectrum from mundane petty crimes to civilian resistance against military occupation.

In the field, the Joint Patrols operated direct, unmediated communication. The two jeep commanders maintained contact via a joint walkie-talkie as they tended to various constabulary problems and humanitarian gestures that ranged from car accidents between Israelis and Palestinians, traffic violations by Israeli citizens and crimes such as drug trafficking or the capture of stolen vehicles. On a typical 24-hour workday, eight men from the military police – four Israeli and four Palestinian – served one of four, eight-hour shifts. They made one run every hour up and down the assigned street at a speed of approximately 35 km/hr. One jeep led while the other followed. The arrangement was precise. In Area A, the Palestinian jeep led the Israeli, in Areas B and C, they reversed positions. Both jeeps were required to stay together at all times whether on patrol or at the Rest-Stop, where the men spent a large portion of their eighth-hour shift sitting, eating, talking, laughing, keeping distance, provoking or threatening each other.

Humanitarian gestures were also part of their work. Numerous examples occurred, such as an injured Palestinian soldier escorted by an Israeli jeep into Israel where he was then transported to an Israeli hospital. Or the reverse, when a Palestinian ambulance was called to bring an Israeli soldier, who needed medical care, to a Palestinian hospital. Indeed, gestures of goodwill created another site to realign the balance of power through generosity, but they did not succeed to dissipate Israelis' persistent concern over the treatment of Israel citizens. The common reaction of Israeli military personnel was, fear of, unfair, inconsistent or dangerous treatment by armed Palestinian police. To relinquish control to the Palestinian security forces Israelis sought proof of Palestinian professionalism. As such, Joint Patrols enacted a performance of 'as-if' equivalence between Israeli and Palestinian security personnel and created an ongoing context to test trustworthiness.

Security cooperation, structured by the Oslo Accords, was a discrete mechanism detached from the defense forces that sought to implement 'security' through military control and power. It was an isolated, sterile bubble – a discrete security instrument that represented a modicum of neutrality used to support the transition towards peace. Indeed, at the macro-level the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) possessed unequivocal control over the majority of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Simultaneously, the Palestinian Authority (PA) operated additional security forces within Areas A and B, which created internal struggles within the security apparatus of the PA. Consequently, the security cooperation infrastructure existed in detached isolation from other security forces that controlled the West Bank.

Peacekeepers and the Israeli and Palestinian Militaries

The constabulary mission of Israeli–Palestinian 'peacekeeping' involved specialized units, detached from other military arms of the respective defense

forces of Israel³¹ and the Palestinian Authority.³² They embodied a separate security paradigm, which functioned simultaneously but autonomously within the IDF and the Palestinian Security Forces. Their mission supported the transition from war towards peace and their soldiers-turned-peacekeepers were not assumed to embody neutrality or impartiality but professionalism and commitment to the rules outlined in the interim agreement. Palestinian and Israeli military men were bound to each other in their professional role as a security cooperation force to make joint field decisions and deploy joint patrols.

The dilemmas faced by their constabulary mission resembled those faced by other traditional peacekeeping missions and their mission was compatible with the principles of peacekeeping operations. Although other security cooperation projects have existed, such as in Ireland and Germany,³³ they could not be considered 'non-mediated peacekeeping' where trained soldiers were assigned a peacebuilding mission.³⁴ To contextualize Israeli–Palestinian security cooperation as a form of peacekeeping, despite the lack of direct third-party intervention, may prove worthwhile and in keeping with Boutros-Bouros Ghali's call for an expanded notion of third-party intervention: 'Peacekeeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace'.³⁵ As a military/security project the Joint Patrols and the security complex that contained them forced an innovative technique where they performed a role 'betwixt and between,'³⁶ war and peace and subsequently faced similar conditions as other peacekeeping forces. They may reveal a technique valuable for researchers and practitioners of what is commonly recognized as peacekeeping.

Themes drawn from peacekeeping research indicate similar social mechanisms as those that transpired on the Joint Patrols. Like the Israeli–Palestinian Joint Patrols, analogous sentiments of ambivalence and ambiguity faced the warriors serving as peacekeepers on the Somalia project Operation Restore Hope, which American Military Personnel found to be 'a confusing mission'.³⁷ Like UN Peacekeepers, confusion, boredom and despair appeared often in the narratives of the Joint Patrolmen who had the additional and confounding role requirement to assume a comprehensive transformation from enemies to partners in peace-building.

Another theme in UN peacekeeping literature regards adaptability. Shamir and Ben-Ari discuss the future 'face' of the military where modern armies must contend not only with modern information technologies but also with a blurring of distinctions between civilian and military operations. Blurring distinctions between civilian and military operations mirror the conflicts seen on the Joint Patrols. Palestinian civilians and their quasi-military were in a shared struggle for self-determination. Military duty and the political civilian struggle for national self-determination existed as a unified whole, which

framed Palestinian professional practice within a political discourse. In contrast, Israeli military and border police created professional distinctions. The practice of professional ethics and discipline bracketed the men and their work as a professional project not a political exercise. Contrasting political and professional frames revealed an underlying divergence in the construction of Israeli and Palestinian masculinity³⁸ but also enabled and forced an adaptative process to occur, without which the men could not fulfill their mission. Despite these conflicting forces, Israeli and Palestinian fighters, like the humanitarian soldiers in Somalia who put themselves in the Somalis' place,³⁹ potentiated the transformation of the 'Other' as an 'object' to fear and distrust into a 'Subject' whose behavior would be familiar and predictable. Their mission enabled a process of mutual adaptation and humanization.

Another point of similarity between the Joint Patrols and traditional peacekeeping is the tension between constabulary and military ethics.⁴⁰ In the case of the Joint Patrols, peace-related campaigns placed military leaders in close contact with civilian populations and civilian bodies. They were involved – like the UN peacekeepers – in what Alan James identifies as the three categories of UN peacekeeping: finger-pointing, face-saving and fire-watching.⁴¹ All three elements comprised the work of the Joint Patrol/DCO project and further suggest the relevance of conceptualizing the Joint Patrols as another, perhaps fourth, generation form of peacekeeping.⁴²

Similar to the UN peacekeepers, Israeli and Palestinians were unable to actively affect the balance of power held by other security forces to which they were an isolated part. While hope existed that cooperation would build trust and peace, Palestinians and Israelis struggled with the constabulary ethic of 'absolute minimal force and impartiality.'⁴³ Furthermore, the persistent knowledge that should the peace process fail each side would revert back to their previous roles loomed precariously as a real possibility and intensified the sense of mask-wearing friendliness.

The Joint Patrols, like other peacekeeping missions, were constrained by time and designed to exist for a limited time period. Like combat soldiers, boredom, frustration and a sense that their hands were tied⁴⁴ were consistent themes heard among Joint Patrolmen. Field observations supported what Rikhye *et al.* noted of peacekeeping in general, that there is 'a limited period that a soldier can remain at a peak level doing a task of this kind – ideally not longer than six months.'⁴⁵ Israeli protocol recognized similar concerns and assigned joint patrolmen the task for a six-month period, rotating them out to other security operations – contrasting their Palestinian counterparts who fulfilled the role for many years. In contrast, 'non-mediated peacekeeping' operations were expected to end. Joint Patrols were recognized as a transitional project to conclude with the signing of a final peace agreement, earmarked five years after the signing of Oslo I. Their demise in October 2000

occurred one and half years after the due-date on 4 May 1999 of a permanent status agreement.

Lastly, research on peacekeeping has raised the study of emotion as a legitimate topic for analysis. The literature includes studies on boredom,⁴⁶ emotional illness,⁴⁷ or the emotional ambivalence of fighters as peacekeepers.⁴⁸ However, emotions have not been examined as a resource for negotiation. The reason may be related to gender. Carol Cohn reminds us that to think well and fully about security may mean to confront gendered expectations of what topics are considered legitimate. Emotions and subjective descriptions of human reality are generally believed to distort clear thinking and rational analysis because of what defense intellectuals consider rigorous.⁴⁹

Crawford further recommends that security scholars need to develop theories on the complex relationship between emotion and international security.⁵⁰ Findings revealed emotion-work to be a vital instrumental security practice that could not be ignored. Indeed, in order to make rational sense out of the joint project of security cooperation in general and the confidence building mission specifically, the search for trustworthiness placed emotion-management as a central operational agenda that effected both micro and macro-level relations. The discussion and ethnographic material presented below examines one aspect of the negotiation and management of emotion – the struggle over authenticity.

Informal Mechanisms to Sustain Relations

Avi (Israeli Joint Patrolman, Tulkarem)

Q: How do you feel on the Joint Patrol?

A: I feel that I have to put on a mask – that I am hypocritical. There is no trust after the September Incident.⁵¹ One describes that they would laugh together but now, since September, the mood changed. There was one Palestinian, Faraj, who protected our jeep. He's ok, but everything is a performance. 'Respect them and suspect them.' The Palestinians have bad memories and they put them across. I can see these bad memories in their eyes. They can't remove it. The relationship is a double hypocrisy.

Q: Do you have the feeling that there is something shared between you and the Palestinians as people?

A: As people? Both of us are people but the essential point is that ultimately, the Arab countries are our enemies. There is nothing we can do and for that reason we have to be here. We've always been at war with them, and incidents like the September Incident prove that you

can't rely upon them. You can't trust them so that you can have a real feeling of security.

The conflict to make sense of what one does with what one thinks and feels revealed the disquieting reality faced by most Israeli and Palestinian actors on the Joint Patrols. It raised the distinction between what Hochschild identifies as surface and deep acting.⁵² 'Surface' body or material gestures may not replicate 'deeper' enactments. The 'doingness' of relations often contradicted what the men felt were appropriate, genuine or safe. 'Mental brackets'⁵³ that frame meanings, when examined, open a window of insight into how the men succeeded or failed to enact the transition from fighters to peacekeepers. Men based their interpretations not only upon political frustration and asymmetric relations of power, but also upon memories, failed tests, temporality and struggles over the direction of adaptive change. Masks reflected expectations that the trust-building measure was either a real step or an illusive gesture.

The Israeli Case

The Israeli Joint Patrols consisted of a divergent mixture of men from various ethnic and historical backgrounds. As one Border Police commander describes: 'The Border Police is like a *Kibbutz Galuyot*'.⁵⁴ Israel's Border Police contain a complex demographic composition that includes a large proportion of non-Jewish combatants. According to the 1997 Israeli Border Police demographic report, the Border Police consisted of 30 per cent Israeli 'national minorities' (Druze, Bedoin, Christians, Muslims and Circassians), 60 per cent Jewish Israeli-born 'veterans,' (55 per cent *Mizrachim* – Middle Eastern origins; 5 per cent *Ashkenazim* – European origins) and 10 per cent Jewish immigrants (5 per cent from Russia and 5 per cent from Ethiopia). The men were not united by their marginalized socio-economic status within Israeli society but by their common desire to serve in what the Israeli Defense Forces classifies as a 'fighting unit.'⁵⁵ Border Police 'fighters', including the Druze 'national minority',⁵⁶ were obligated to do three years military duty and, like all other 'fighters,' must give their consent to serve in a fighting unit.

'Veteran' Jewish fighters achieved 'veteran' status from years spent controlling the *Intifada* resistance. Veterans – whether *Mizrachim* or *Ashkenazim* – were generally described by their commanders as 'simpler' (Jakobi, Israeli Border Police Officer, Shechem) than men from other fighting units in the IDF. Their mental health officer identified them as 'poorer and less educated ... (who) still can't control themselves,' (Alex, Mental Health Officer, Border Police). 'Veterans' posed an obstacle to the organizational practice of joint patrolling. They were singled out to be more reactive and likely either to provoke or be provoked by their Palestinian counterparts more than other groups identified among the border police.

The Joint Patrols as 'Worthless'

Shaul, interviewed in Hebron in 1997, was a 'veteran' *Mizrachi* Jew who, like many other patrolmen I interviewed, framed the Joint Patrol to be a 'worthless' project. He reasoned that working with any Palestinian policeman was dangerous and that a working relationship threatened his life.

Shaul (Israeli Joint Patrolman, Hebron)

It's a waste. A Palestinian commander came up to me and said as soon as he can, he'll shoot me. I am going to start firing at them and destroy the entire Joint Patrol project.

According to Shaul's logic, the act of shooting his counterpart would preempt the inevitable belligerence between Palestinian and Israeli forces. To anticipate the more 'honest' relations he preferred to destroy the operation and break through the institutionalized 'time out'⁵⁷ or 'interstitial crack' in social structures that generally arises during points of transition.⁵⁸ Oslo's Interim Agreements established the 'in-between' time frame that fomented his desire to shoot his 'colleague' in order to depart from the limbo state.⁵⁹ His actions – or so he imagined – would change the current structure to either regress into clearly defined positions as occupier and occupied or develop into relations unequivocally delineated as enemies. Since both sides were equipped with guns that enabled each side to shoot the other, Shaul contended with the very categories that placed him in danger. It was the sense of his own frailty, through the ultimate vulnerability and danger posed to his body in the presence of a dangerous enemy, which established the critical mental framing of who could be trusted.

The inability to engage in a non-violent relationship based upon a modicum of trust was identified by numerous 'veteran' patrolmen. Their 'bracketing' manifested in techniques of practice – violent, reactive or resistant – which contradicted the very role required of peacemakers engaged in a cooperative project. And Sassoon was not alone. Additional voices of 'veterans' strengthened the position from which the Joint Patrols were interpreted as worthless, dangerous and hopeless. The quote below includes phrase fragments from men who spoke simultaneously about the general negative effects of the Joint Patrols.

(Joint Patrolmen, Kalkilieh)

The joint patrols? It's a waste of time. There is no point. We don't trust them – they point their guns at us. We can't talk to them – we don't share the same language – we don't speak Arabic.

The set of phrases cited here and above reflects essential arguments that run throughout the narratives of Israeli Joint Patrolmen. First, they express

the sense of futility in the mission and thus, their time being wasted. But their claim of wastefulness resides within the greater struggle to having lost control over the very men they must engage in mutual contact. ‘There is no point’ because Israeli joint patrolmen were unable to engage in a relation of equivalence with men they could not trust. Palestinian trustworthiness could not be built for those who held memories of the *Intifada* or of the September Incident ‘when they shot at us’ (Avi, Israeli Joint Patrolman, Kalkilieh) or through current practices where they ‘point their guns at us’ (Shlomo, Israeli Joint Patrolman, Tulkarem). Indeed, the experience that there was no trust was based upon social practice and failed tests in which the working relations proved to ‘veteran’ patrolmen that ‘you can’t trust them’ (Shlomo, Israeli Joint Patrolman, Jericho). Worthlessness was inseparable from the perceived lack of trustworthiness.

Temporality and the Discontinuity of Frames

The veterans spoke with the authority of ‘knowing the Palestinians’ through years spent as a ‘lethal force’ (Amin, Border Patrol Commanding Officer, NW) during the *Intifada* period (1987–93). Their epistemology was heard through various catch phrases. These phrases not only attributed essential stereotypic qualities to all Palestinians but also reflected the prevailing theme regarding the Israeli Joint Patrolmen’s own sense of vulnerability.

Amir (Israeli Joint Patrolman, Kalkilieh)

I know how they think. They’ll drink coffee one day and the next day stab you in the back. The only thing Arabs understand is force because you can’t trust an Arab.

Veterans did not consider the men in the other jeep distinct from the men they once controlled through the West Bank or more recently controlled in Areas B and C. There were not two types of Palestinians, the ones who worked as partners and the ones they suspected at checkpoints. Thus, the veterans tended to frame their partner as dangerous and untrustworthy, a condition that contradicted re-positioning those same Palestinian counterparts into a relation of professional equivalence. Consequently, where seniority, experience and an ‘insider’s’ knowledge may have proven greater competence it actually established a direct and non-resolvable incongruity between feeling and form. The contradiction undermined rather than enhanced the ‘veteran’s’ skill to manage and adapt to the new field where working relationships with Palestinians had to be built.

Yossi is another case in point. He spent three years ‘living’ in Tulkarem during the *Intifada* and described his ‘living there’ as the variable that enabled him to know Palestinians. Through his capacity to ‘live there with the Arabs,

with the rocks and with the *Intifada* he developed an embittered understanding of ‘Arab mentality,’ identified in his narrative.

Yossi (Israeli Joint Patrolman, Tulkarem)

I hate them – they killed my friend, an officer from an elite paratroop unit, days before his release. I’ll kill them. Don’t you think that they’ll kill me if the situation changes or if given the chance? We lived with them for three years during the *Intifada* then suddenly, in a day, we had to shake their hands and drink coffee.

The peace is not up to me, it is up to the politicians. We do the job that no one else wants to do. The army tried to change our feelings. They brought in psychologists to train us for the changed relations. They brought in guys from the army who never had contact with Palestinians, who had no background. They came into the JP as our commanders and didn’t mind.

Yossi remembers the hatred felt towards him, the death of his friend killed days before his release from the army and the attempt made by the Israeli army to ‘change our feelings.’ He resisted organizational attempts orchestrated to shift his sentiments and recalls memories that cannot be forgotten or transformed by psychologists. For this reason ‘guys from the army who never had contact with Palestinians’ and who lack memories, did not ‘mind’ working on the Joint Patrol. His narrative reflects the fluidity of shifting frames among soldiers who, ‘if given the chance’ or the command, would kill one another.

Amir (Israeli Joint Patrolman, Kalkilieh)

Q: Is there such a thing as trust among the Palestinian people?

A: Of course, they are soldiers like us. It’s not that there is not trust. They are soldiers like we are soldiers. They do their job according to their commander like I do mine. It’s not a situation that can create trust. They are soldiers.

Today you are given the command to make peace. And tomorrow, you are given the command to attack.

Amal: If I am given the command to do peace, I will shake hands and do it but inside, what do I feel? That is what I am saying.

Schlomo: You feel the reality.

Amal: No, that is not what you feel.

Q: What do you feel?

Amal: You can’t turn your back on them.

Q: Why? Because they are soldiers, because of their personality?

Amal: Because there is no trust in them.

Confusion arises in the above narrative between trustworthiness as a Palestinian attribute or as a consequence of soldiering. Were Palestinians seen as untrustworthy because they were Palestinian or because the Israelis maintain an asymmetric balance of power, irreconcilable through the performance of security cooperation? I argue that reasons for the worthlessness of the Joint Patrols cannot be tied exclusively to the interpretation of trustworthiness as an essential attribute of Palestinian men. It must be tied to a precarious temporality of position. Israeli border policemen were aware that, as soldiers, they were acting upon command to engage in a relationship of equivalence but that their orders could change, shifting the essential quality of the relationship as a practice of 'as-if' equivalence. Thus, if instructed to engage in mutual handshaking one day they knew that if ordered to engage in mutual gunfire on the following day they would perform their new task. Israeli patrolmen were clearly aware that their role was subject to the forces of political winds that could turn at any moment. The temporal stress then, was not only the shifting before Oslo and within the Oslo period, but also in what loomed ahead as a possible scenario should the peace process fail in the future.

Temporal stress and the embodiment of uncertainty manifested in practices of provocations and resistance. The result was the veteran's general susceptibility to react with violence, whether verbal or physical. Fistfights arose on the Joint Patrols over verbal insults. Numerous incidents, including where a Palestinian patrolman cocked and pointed his gun at his Israeli counterparts, occurred over what Israeli jeep commanders named 'stupid, idiotic things,' such as swearing, pushing or arguing over who was driving too slowly or who had gestured an insult. In other words, a direct consequence of these contradictory forces was a highly reactive population of patrolmen prone to violence. Israeli veterans did not want to work through surface but through deep acting and this influenced the way they understood themselves and their work. Commanded to work together, the role of relationship-making was framed in fakeness – a fake, hypocritical performance – and the performers resisted the disguise.

The JP as a Fake Performance

A masquerade arises among some Israeli actors who consider their faces masked and their bodies disguised.⁶⁰ Indeed, for many, if not most, Israeli border policemen, the work required wearing masks. Ben-Ari, in his study of 'mastering soldiers', examines soldiering and mask-wearing where masks are not necessarily a disguise but a hidden aspect of the self revealed through the mask.⁶¹ Concepts of 'real' 'authentic' or 'genuine' were not the focus of his study as in the case of Israeli Joint Patrolmen. In the current study, masks blurred truth from hidden meanings that could sabotage the transition from

fighters to peacekeepers. Mask-wearing offered insight into how soldiers resolved what they saw as a contradiction between the real and the fake.

The phenomenology of ‘playing the role,’ with the wide spectrum of expressive options, reflects an adaptive process among the Druze patrolmen generally found lacking among the ‘old-timers.’ This pattern provides a primary example of how nuances of ethnic diversity are embodied as cognitive and kinesthetic processes. The way policemen talk about their work, how they express themselves in the field and in their attitudes about their own ethnic, national and professional identities reflect the difference. Consequently, if ‘masks’ are worn and we examine what lies behind them, an underlying tension is revealed over what constitutes respect and trustworthiness and how ethnic identity impacts upon this process.

The key strategy used by Amal, in the narrative above, is that he ‘brackets’ the role as a stabilizing mechanism. Amal, a Druze policeman, has the ability to ‘become friends’ in order to know ‘the power that is sitting next to (him).’ Security cooperation was his ‘job today’ but the job was not met with the resistance or disdain typically described by his ‘veteran’ Jewish counterparts. The JP was seen as an essential task, part of the ‘political, military’ and personal relations established between citizens of Israel and members of the ‘Palestinian territory.’ To like, hate or feel trusting did not arise as problematic by virtue of his capacity to ‘shake hands’ on command. What he ‘feels inside’ need not coincide with the order he must fulfill, particularly if the order was situated within the paradigm: ‘Respect him and suspect him’. The capacity for Amal, like other Druze policemen and officers, not only to speak Arabic but also perform the relationship, helped position their centrality in security cooperation at the DCO and on the Joint Patrols. Despite limited trustworthiness felt towards Palestinians, Druze policemen and officers claimed finesse in balancing both acts of respect with persistent suspicion.

Druze interacted within relations of trust in what Bourdieu describes from his Berber studies as ‘cultivated dispositions’.⁶² Despite sentiments of suspicion described above, numerous encounters between Druze policeman and their Palestinian counterparts or colleagues revealed intimacy and trust. The following field-note describes a case in point.

(3 Dec. 1997, Palestinian DCO, Tulkarem)

Into the DCO commander’s room comes a bald, gray-haired Israeli policeman (who I later discover is Druze) and a young Palestinian policeman. Both are relaxed, leaning forward towards me against the chair with their guns perched on their hips. Talking, discussing, smiling moving around and shifting their weight, the ensuing discussion in Arabic ends and the younger man leads the older police officer out of the door first, gently placing his hand around the older man’s waist.

Just below his fingers is the Israeli's gun. There is no tension, no bound flow noticeable even though the younger man could easily draw the Israeli's gun. It is in their mutual interest to trust each other.

Movement observation revealed the lack of body tension, the delicate lightness of touch, the willingness of the Israeli to present his back and gun to the younger Palestinian officer. Telling jokes or during games of backgammon where the Israeli police officer played with his Palestinian colleagues – even though such game-playing was against Israeli army regulations – their interaction created social cohesion. These displays were particularly apparent when the Israeli policeman was on the Palestinian side of the DCO or within Area A at the rest stop.

Playing according to Palestinian rules further expressed identification with and safety felt by the Israeli among Palestinians within the bounds of Palestinian territory. Themes of hospitality, however, may not necessarily imply trustworthiness as they do strategies of power and position.⁶³ Comfort and friendship within the bounds of the Palestinian commander's office may have equally supported warm relations as they reproduced Palestinian sovereignty. Indeed the direction of adaptive change forced men to improvise, constructing a field that placed professional identity at stake.

The Joint Patrol as an Improvised Job Between Armies

In contrast to the policemen, Israeli Joint Patrol jeep commanders were generally brought into the border police from the IDF – typically from tank units or paratroopers with experience from the Lebanese war. They framed the work as a task performed between armies and, as such, a professional, well-disciplined operation.

Rami (Israeli JP Jeep Commander, Kalkilieh)

As an officer in the IDF I had three tanks and soldiers and a lot of power. Suddenly you come here, you get a jeep, a driver and two soldiers who you are responsible for. It is quieter on the brain and less responsibility.

Rami came prepared from the tank forces to impose discipline among his policemen and found that he needed to adapt army protocols to a new context. Flexibility was essential in order to develop a working relationship with his Palestinian counterparts. Knowing how to 'play the game' required that he could no longer impose strict adherence to the rules as required by Israeli military procedure. While his task was to hone the discipline among the Joint Patrolmen, he found that he had to unlearn his own disciplined repertoire, particularly the body practice associated with the handling of weapons. And this physical adaptation effected how he perceived the work.

Rami (Israeli JP Jeep Commander, Kalkilieh)

In the IDF, every move is well planned and organized. You go here, you arrive there with clearly defined commands. It is forbidden to do this and that (regarding behavior, handling of guns). In the Border Police it is a different army – your orders don't apply to me. For example, the gun should be pointed down and back when sitting down – that is according to orders. But the officer of the Palestinians came to me and said that his policemen behind us are afraid because the guns are pointing in their direction. Ok it is your judgment call – even though according to the military command I can insist. I could tell him to go 'fuck' himself and create a cycle that could irritate him, escalate into violence and provoke all the territories. Or I can compromise and give-in. I can command my soldiers to lower the gun's barrel between their legs. Then he is satisfied and you are satisfied. You must arrive to the golden road towards peace. On the Joint Patrol he (the Palestinian) is the army. He has a gun. If you start to argue – who knows where it could lead?

Rami's motivation to break rules and adapt reflects the pressures of not knowing 'where it could lead.' The importance of rule-breaking must be emphasized since the Israeli army has rigidly imposed regulations, specifically on the use of guns. Described as their 'culture of guns' – *tarbut haneshek* – a soldier who cocks his gun or points it at someone can be put in jail. Soldiers and policemen are drilled daily over the proper handling of their guns. The vast disparity of force between the Palestinian 'army' and the Israeli 'army' was irrelevant. Rami referred to the Joint Patrol as part of the Palestinian army. He framed the force with whom he works 'across the table' as a force equal to himself. Though legally, the Palestinian Authority agreed to limit its security force to a police force with various branches they described themselves as soldiers and trained their force as an army. Thus, the Israeli Jeep commander improvised a set of body practices in order to 'play the game' of Joint Patrolling and struggle with the direction of adaptive change.

Stability through Protective Shields

Noam, another jeep commander, arrived to the Joint Patrols after having achieved entry into the pilot's course and later served in the tank corps. He too considered the Joint Patrol as a professional task, which stabilized the field. Like his colleague, he stressed the importance of improvisation and struggled with issues of authenticity similar to the narratives found among his Border Patrolmen. Noam acquired the protective shield, the false disguise, the mask of performing cooperation with a smile after an incident that proved that he must 'respect them and suspect them.' The emergent mistrust arose from field experience alone. In a stark example of broken trust, Noam describes himself

as ‘holding his men back’ while they were being teased and taunted by their Palestinian counterparts.

I got here after most of the guys here and came with the attitude that if I do the maximum in order not to open an incident, to truly solve problems through peace and dialogue that my opposing side would always behave with the same attitude. That is what I expected. Well in that incident, everything exploded in my face because truly it was one sided – completely – they were really not ok. They spat at us – metaphorically – we ate it – truly from the morning they agitated us, they did a lot of provocations and I ignored it all. The day of the incident I had even stopped that same policeman and fought with him telling him that we are not little children playing a teasing game and we do not react to idiotic things like this. *Vitarti, vitarti, vitarti* (I gave in) – and in the end the result was that I held back our soldiers and they beat us up. And I wouldn’t let our soldiers give it back to them and they beat us up. All the time I held back my policemen and put them back in the jeep with force. Then it was the final blow in the end when my driver, one of the one’s with the most open mind, got smashed in the head. I, seeing all the hatred, almost began to cry after the incident. All the peace work is not worth it to me if one of my soldiers gets wounded. I also felt a profound disappointment when everything exploded in my face. If this is the peace, I don’t want it if that is the opposing side. And there was this feeling of our being idiots.

Despite the incident that broke his trust, Noam remained faithful to the task but adopted the consistent theme heard among officers and commanders alike regarding military discipline. They referred to the strong structure – what they called ‘the iron-clad mission’ – *misimat habarzel* – that emerged from the text of the Oslo Agreement. Noam, like other Israeli Jeep Commanders, reflected the commitment to be workers of peace. He framed his role as a source of stability, achievable through an army of trained military men engaged in an operation with clearly defined rules, regulations and procedures outlined in the Oslo document and formalized within military regulations. But because he bracketed stability as constituted through the formal and professional structure and hierarchy of an army, the practice of adaptation and informal relations achieved by ‘knowing how much milk and sugar they like in their coffee’ made the work personal and subject to the stress over authenticity.

I am yes (sighs) strongly in favor of being together with them as much as possible – in cooperation and I see how much it helps me in the work. Many times it is clear that when you come to a person and we drink coffee together, shake hands, say shalom, smile, terrific – already there

is a different attitude towards solving problems. But everything changed after the Palestinian Jeep commander struck my driver.

Q: Where is he now?

A: He and his soldier who beat up my driver were supposed to be sent to prison. We have not seen him here again. In short, he began to lie that we started it. The Palestinian Commander of the JP, with whom we basically had good relations, he couldn't look at us in the face, he was uncomfortable at hearing us being called liars. He could feel that the Palestinian jeep commander was inventing a story. What happened was that the Palestinian side really justified our side unequivocally. And truly, many patrols after that, and during the conference of commanders, many commanders came up to me and expressed appreciation and told me 'all the honor to you' (his voice fluctuates cynically). Afterward the Palestinian commander, who speaks perfect English so that it was easy to communicate with him, suddenly took it upon himself and arranged his schedule as a personal mission that he would work with me and speak with me. Abu Mohammed spoke of visiting the soldier in the hospital to bring him flowers. Ultimately their side truly expressed all the apology so that nothing has happened since. But for me I continue my work normally, I play it. I can't keep on hating, it is because of my personality – I am not able to keep on hating. But in the next incident, it is difficult for me to say that I will have the belief, that I will do so much – I won't let the chance happen again to let my soldiers get beaten up – and that my soldiers were injured and I did not react. I won't let the chance again, of that complete trust in the opposing side. I won't take that chance.

A: (one of the soldiers interrupts): I know them. Almost two years working here. After September 1996, I know them. I don't get excited from them. I know that you can sit fine with them, drink coffee and the next minute they can start a fight.

Thus, Noam explains that while 'being together' helps 'in the work' field experience transformed what he conceptualized as an authentic performance and shifted it into one which he understood as a disguise. The work became infused with an 'as if' warmth. He 'played' because as a professional disciplined soldier he was required to do so. However, that he even raises the possibility to give 'complete trust' reflects his culturally specific position. It again suggests an underlying mental frame influenced by ethnicity. Indeed, neither Druze nor Palestinian named a relationship as one with 'complete trust.' The great disappointment is where Noam lost the innocence of trust which transformed his authentic performance to one performed

‘normally,’ but it also reflected his conception of what constitutes professionalism.

Indeed, the Joint Patrols were a site where professional identity and national identity converged. In Noam’s case, he expected that his ‘opposing side would always behave with the same attitude’ as himself but he failed to acknowledge the internal tensions and struggles faced by Palestinians both in their familial loyalties for revenge and in their national struggle to release the reigns of occupation. Noam had attempted to position his counterpart within his ‘honor group’⁶⁴ where his professional counterparts embraced the same code of military ethics. Noam assumed his Palestinian counterparts to possess a set of shared professional standards. When their standards did not meet the test, he saw them ‘not just as inferior but often also as despicable.’⁶⁵ Noam failed to see that the violence and ‘childish games’ were acts of resistance by his Palestinian counterparts to the very existence of Joint Patrols. Thus, he was shocked not only by the broken trust, but also by what he interpreted as the lack of professional valor. Yet the question of whether Noam understood the symbolic meaning of Joint Patrols in the Gaza Strip and their political message of occupation remains unclear. For, conceivably, resistance embodied in the violent act of his Palestinian counterpart could be equally framed as a struggle to restructure relations of the power within the field.

The practical implications of the Palestinian patrolman’s resistance through violence, sparked Noam’s disillusionment and shifted his framing them other no longer within a circle of shared values, of comrades in arms, but with an unwelcome edge of suspicion that had not been there before. Noam adapted the principle of ‘respect them and suspect them.’ Like in September 1996, Israeli security forces saw themselves as making themselves vulnerable through belief in the other and then being ‘stabbed in the back.’ For Noam, he learned to ‘play it,’ to put on a mask, which disguised his true feelings of disgust. The work had been a genuine attempt to create a fraternity based upon military honor and professionalism. Once the trust was broken, the performance became fake and untrustworthy.

The Palestinian Case

Palestinian Joint Patrols, similar to the Israelis, were comprised of men who could be classified into groups. Palestinian groupings, however, were not based upon ethnic or religious diversity, but upon political and geographical histories. Palestinian policemen were ‘children from the field’, in contrast to their commanding officers who generally arrived in 1994 from the Palestinian Diaspora. Palestinian Joint Patrolmen were young men who had grown out of the *Intifada*. Many if not most carried impassioned memories of beaten fathers, destroyed homes, cousins killed or maimed, or prolonged prison terms and years of life growing under the occupation and its subsequent resistance as

the *Intifada*. Identities of belonging referred to cities, villages and regions. The men referred to homes within pre-1948 borders in current-day Israeli cities, to villages destroyed in 1948 or to areas beyond the green line within any ‘Palestinian area.’ In other words, home was conceptualized without the 1967 border, despite the fact that the younger Joint Patrol policemen were born and raised in the West Bank or Gaza Strip.

The Palestinians who participated as either patrolmen or their commanders joined the Joint Patrols by choice and framed the Joint Patrols in three discrete ways. One was as a job, which entitled them to a salary, a social milieu and job training. Many Palestinian Joint Patrolmen were college graduates or ‘graduates’ of Israeli prisons looking for work. Enormous financial resources had been funneled into the Palestinian’s security infrastructure and provided jobs. Second, the patrolmen conceptualized the work as the embodiment of the peace process. ‘Working together’ (Nadim, Palestinian DCO Officer, Tulkarem) was instrumental as a political component of a revolutionary arrangement – revolutionary in the sense that the men were engaged in enactments of equivalence that reproduced what Nadim described as their ‘historic compromise’ to accept the State of Israel. The Palestinian policemen and their officers framed the Joint Patrol within the acquisition of nationhood and the achievement of freedom from the Israeli occupation. Lastly, the work was symbolic of their national struggle and political determination towards nation building. Objects and performances were representations to be seen. Palestinians both at the JP level and at the DCO level regarded the Joint Patrol as a symbol that reflected their accomplishment to face Israeli military police eye-to-eye and gun-to-gun.

Creating a Life with the ‘Other’

The interviews conducted in Tulkarem, Kalkilieh and Ramallah revealed a pattern described to me by both Israelis and Palestinians. Palestinian ‘children of the *Intifada*’ were ‘local boys,’ many of whom were studying at the university or had recently completed university studies. They came to the Joint Patrol selected by senior commanders for the job and ready to work by choice in security cooperation.

Iyad (Palestinian Joint Patrolman, Kalkilieh)

Q: Is there a future to the Joint Patrols?

A: When the JP stops – there is no peace.

Q: Are you glad to be in the JP?

A: Yes. I tried to work in Israel before, and the Israeli commander over there was at the checkpoint and didn’t let me through. (He pointed to Boris, a Russian immigrant who had begun his university studies).

I didn't have papers. But now I am working and glad to be part of the peace process. This place works to let the peace go. For the military to work at this site, it is the responsibility of the two officers – both Israeli and Palestinian.

Q: What new things have you learned since being on the patrols?

A: Before working together there was a wall. If the peace process goes, maybe I will make a life with Israelis.

Q: Were you surprised by anything?

A: Before the *Intifada* – we were enemies. Now, during September (referring to the September 1996 Tunnel Incident), we worked together and the fighting stopped in 20 minutes.

The vivid image of the occupier transformed into co-worker captures a prevailing essence to the conceptual bracket. The Joint Patrols embodied the peace through a shift in positions of power. Thus, even when he explained why he liked the work, the Palestinian policeman inserted the image of the armed Israeli who had once controlled him. The political, professional and personal identities of the Palestinian policeman made a vertical shift upward to meet the Israeli 'Other' as similar to self. His oppressor, capable of curtailing and defining space and access to it, at least during the eight-hour shift, no longer possessed the secret key alone. The symbolic meaning of Joint Patrolling enabled the shifting from 'Facelessness to Face' and thus the work potentiated the failure or success to reproduce the national identity of these 'children of the *Intifada*.'

Flags, uniforms, guns, jeeps and military training afforded the Palestinian policemen the paraphernalia of power, national valor and personal honor. Concern over disguises and hypocrisy never arose in the interviews. Joint Patrol policemen framed their work as a strategic practice to achieve nationhood and not as a fake performance of solidarity and camaraderie. Rather, the conceptual frame consisted of the capacity to engage in a role and to interpret the role as practice, imbued with public and national meaning.

The relationship then, rather than a tension of internal forces between authentic or inauthentic masking as in the Israeli case, represented the transition into the future moment of statehood. Practitioners of the relationship were selected by the Palestinian leadership to maximize the success of the performance.

Nadim (Palestinian DCO Officer, Tulkarem)

Q: Are the soldiers who work on the JP chosen? How do they come to work on the JP?

A: They come from the Palestinian area – from ‘Halil,’ (Hebron) from Gaza.

They must have some characteristics. The young men who work in the JP are not always better than other soldiers. But we do our best to take young men who are calm, with a good mind, not hot (temperamental or explosive) but quiet. They must also have a good appearance and clothing. For us it is also important that the cultures between Israeli and Palestinian are at an equal level. They must undergo specialized studies and training in our military schools. They will learn about the peace process. We look at him and try to evaluate the psychological case of each soldier. After three or four months of training the leaders decide if he will be good for the police or good for JP or some other position.

Soldiers were selected with the requisite qualities that would sustain ‘non-mediated peacekeeping.’ Rather than reflecting mask-wearing, they revealed an authentic, embodied capacity to perform the role. Palestinian Joint Patrolmen were chosen among other young men, for qualities and temperaments, ‘not hot, but ‘calm with a good mind.’ They were chosen for an expressive repertoire and political perspective.

Omar (Palestinian DCO Officer, Kalkilieh)

We are working to let this peace process go and do not take care of other things (i.e. they do not do multiple security-related jobs like their Israeli counterparts). We take care of our soldiers in all situations of life. We structure the 12-hour shifts so that our soldiers can study in the university. If he wants to marry, we ask if the girl has a brother against the peace process. If we find 1 per cent not going with our policy, we remove him from the unit.

Omar explains the importance of ‘working to let this peace process go’ and of his organization’s commitment to succeed. He notes that the Palestinian National Authority assigns his ‘soldiers’ the exclusive task of joint patrolling unlike, as he notes, his Israeli counterparts who fulfill other security-related roles. Thus, his men were geared specifically to the practice of peace-building and were selected and prepared to engage in this mission. Although attitudes reflected that they ‘take care of (their) soldiers in all situations of life’ this was only up to the point where professional commitment and familial loyalty may clash. Loyalty to the mission then became a familial construct tied to obligations or influences that arose through marriage. If family members of a bride were against the peace process then the soldier would be removed from the Joint Patrol unit. In other words, like the policemen who must work away from home, the policy existed to synchronize political practices and the extended family. Beliefs and affiliations of home could not contradict the Joint

Patrols. The Joint Patrols thus became a military zone that reproduced political and familial affiliations.

The Joint Patrols as the Embodiment of Peace

Although families could be the basis of professional and political evaluation, memories could not. Like their Israeli counterpart, Palestinian men brought their recollections and experiences into the field of relations. Under certain conditions, Palestinian policemen spoke Hebrew, which they generally learned doing time in Israeli prisons. When on patrol in Tulkarem, the Palestinian Joint Patrolmen told me about their background and proceeded to enumerate the various locations they knew in Israel – the prisons where they had served time.

Q: (To a policeman with a broken nose): Have any of you been in prison?

A: Yes. I spent 19 months for defending my people. I was in Beer Sheva and all over Israel and the Territories.

Q: Do the Israelis here seem different?

A: It's the work. The work makes the people different. When they are prison guards they behave that way, and when there is peace and we are working together, it is different. They work according to their orders.

The Joint Patrols embodied the success of Palestinian resistance. Former resistance-fighters or political prisoners held in Israeli prisons became the working counterparts of their former collective gatekeepers. Several times I stood at the Rest Stop and watched a Palestinian patrolman point to one of the Israelis and say 'He caught me during the *Intifada*' while the Israeli would either blanch, avert my eyes or move nervously while their Palestinian counterparts smiled. Relations on the Joint Patrols marked the transition. Armed and uniformed Palestinian Joint Patrolmen imbedded the daily practice of joint patrolling with the success of their personal and collective struggle as 'freedom fighters.' That sense of success helped enable them to engage in the choreography despite the limits imposed by the Oslo Agreement.

The transition from freedom fighter to peacekeeper/peacebuilder has been dictated by the job, and, as such, 'the work makes the person different' (Nadim, Palestinian DCO Officer, Tulkarem). Practicing specified performances, 'according to their orders', was not seen as contradictory or hypocritical but the nature of performance. In other words, it was the temporality of the job that instructed Nadim's and the Israeli's behavior. The argument over what was authentic or real did not arise in the narratives of Palestinian policemen or their officers. Instead, distinctions were made over strategies and techniques of practice.

Joint Patrol Commanders

Palestinian commanders had returned to the land from their Diaspora. They arrived as a foreign body with no prior contact with Israelis other than in the battlefields of Jordan, Egypt, Syria, or Lebanon. Those in command had not lived through the occupation nor fought in the *Intifada*. Furthermore, a primary uniting feature of all commanders and officers from the Jeep Commanders up through the DCO, RSC, and JSC was their personal relations in the Palestinian Diaspora. The vast majority of men knew each other in Algeria and arrived together in 1994. Yassar Arafat had assigned Ziad El Atrash, the commander of the Kastel Forces stationed in Algeria, to assume the commanding post of the RSC in 1994. El Atrash then designated his associates who in turn chose their subordinates and so forth along down the line of command. There was a direct connection – a network of relationships where trust had been built and tested over time. Their shared relations intensified the contrast with their Israeli counterparts not only because the Palestinians knew each other and even fought or were imprisoned together, but also because organizationally the DCO and Border Police were forged into the same military operation of security cooperation, as outlined earlier.

Jeep Commanders varied in age, ranging from late twenties to early sixties. The older men had a greater tendency not to conform to military dress code. Thus, I saw unshaven older men holding themselves in a drooping posture and wearing military green uniforms with white socks and dress shoes. Their demeanor and attire contrasted the younger patrolmen who arrived in well-groomed military uniforms. Second, Palestinian Jeep Commanders tended not to talk about their Israeli counterparts or the necessary interpersonal elements for better working relations. On the contrary, I found that they consistently expressed dismay that concerned their hardships and struggle to reclaim the land. If asked about their relations with Israelis, they invariably understood that to mean the ‘Israeli occupiers’ and not the Israelis sitting as counter-parts. When the commanders would complain, they recalled their current pain and not the pain they had endured from the past. In other words, the primary frame reflected their struggle to shift the field of relations and gain access and control over as much as possible.

Their focus, with me, was to prove the difficulty and righteousness of the Palestinian’s position. Jeep Commanders did not mention that they perceived the Israelis’ working relationship as a relationship to create positive sentiments. Narratives of this sort came only from the DCO, among men explicitly assigned the project of relationship building through coordinated efforts and the resolution or management of conflicts. Although one may expect similar perspectives among men who spent eight-hour shifts in the field together, in fact they referred to the structural tensions of displaying solidarity

with Israelis. The jeep commander's leadership to effect pragmatic role-taking held or activated the forces of tension on the Joint Patrols.

Continuity of Frames

Ibrahim, a jeep commander in his late twenties from Gaza, spoke with a moderate command of English and mimicked the approach heard above. In the quote below, he complains against the collective Israeli and not the personalized individual, the Israeli commander with whom he had direct contact.

Shafik (Palestinian JP Jeep Commander, Nezar Junction, Gaza)

Q: What was it like to begin to know Israelis – What did you find out?

A: Before we came here, we thought that we would see the peace in the air, in the street. As the time went by, we have become more and more desperate. Now, there is nothing here.

Q: Do you see that there are different kinds of Israelis?

A: All the Israelis who live in Israel are good, and all those who live here in Gaza and in the West bank (i.e. the settlers) are not good. Why is it that a few hundred Jewish settlers can block passageways for one million Palestinians?

Shafik, like other Palestinian officers, took a micro-level question and transformed it into a political statement. Thus, he chose not to describe the good relations with individual Israelis on the patrols and among the Joint Patrolmen in general. Furthermore, he then formulated mental brackets with 'fine mental lines'⁶⁶ that distinguished good from bad based upon political geography. In other words, he described two kinds of Israelis, 'good ones' who live within Israel's 1967 borders and 'bad ones' responsible for Palestinian desperation who live on the other side, within the Gaza Strip. Location represented a shift in inherent value and humanity, the possibility to move from good to bad depending upon geography, and its explicit or implicit relation to politics.

Security, he argued, could be achieved through a balance of forces; an equivalence of weaponry. Security existed precisely because he possessed a gun like the Israeli military police whereas the 'bad' Israeli army far overpowers in military strength their Palestinian counterpart. Security would arise out of equivalence, rather than 'over-powerment.' In other words, Shafik did not struggle with masks but with establishing a relationship of equivalence. He sought a field where a balance of forces existed and his work as a JP Commander participated in a cooperative structure where two police forces resembled one another in power.

The Israeli army and the Israeli settlers were responsible for the imbalance that placed Palestinians at a weakened position and for this upheaval

he attributed them with ‘badness.’ Yet, while the army and settlers existed beyond the bounds of inclusion, the members of the Joint Patrol were transformed within his bracketing into an included ‘us.’ Israelis on the Joint Patrol were in a relationship to build solidarity through equivalence – an equivalence time-bound by the interim period. The ‘Palestinian revolution’ enabled social actors to perform the roles defined by a time-line and framed as a strategy.

Symbol of National Struggle and the Occupation

Joint Patrol Jeep Commanders managed the tensions between the Israeli and Palestinian jeep policemen and modeled how they should behave. But they were limited in the forms of available currency under their control. Unable to change the current political or economic conditions, they engaged in the delicate shifting and re-framing of the field. Bourdieu’s theory provides insight. The perspective and attitudes social actors take ‘of the field depend(s) on the point of view they take *on* the field as a view taken from a point *in* the field’.⁶⁷ For the Palestinian actors, Jeep Commanders and the leadership above them played a crucial role not only as a medium for contact but also as an assuaging mechanism for the struggle over resources.

Iyad (Palestinian DCO Officer, Tulkarem)

My son’s name is Tha’ir. It means, the man who fights for his rights. The commander and I are old friends who knew each other from Lebanon and spent five years together in a Syrian jail because of our activities in the Palestinian revolution.’

Q: Do you trust Israelis?

A: In our work we have orders, especially in the Joint Mobile Unit.⁶⁸ They should be the same orders and so I won’t be surprised by anything. If I don’t follow all the orders then the leaders will get in trouble.

Q: Are the patrols useful?

A: The patrols are very useful. The Joint Patrols are useful at this time. They help with accidents, stolen cars and crime. The Israeli forces and civilian Palestinians are now handled through the Joint Patrol.

Iyad describes the work without ambivalence over authenticity or masking. The role establishes a degree of equivalence, a project ‘useful at this time.’ Whether loyalty or professionalism binds him to the task, his expressed concern is to prevent leaders from ‘getting in trouble’. He must work within orders and remain within the specific behavioral frame appropriate to a relationship of cooperation. Iyad, like his Israeli counterparts, stressed military orders as the foundation for their work and argues that the work

created a formal relationship. Thus: 'we must work according to our orders so there will be no surprises.' The allusion to orders as a means to reduce uncertainty and thereby increase stability was another refrain heard among certain commanders particularly at the DCO but not with regard to the strains of masking or feigning authenticity as we have seen among the Israelis on the Joint Patrols. Palestinian Jeep Commanders did not tend to talk about relationship building but the fulfillment of symbolically charged roles. Masks did not hide an authentic self, but fit the performance. Deep acting seemed to reveal a performance of one who rightfully belonged to the land and whose professional actions represented the transition process to achieve that claim.

Ibrahim, a man in his late forties/early fifties, sported his military beret and a smile. Born in a village 'ten minutes away from here' he reflected upon his belonging to the land.

Q: What do you feel about the Israelis on the JP?

A: Tell me, you mentioned that your husband is Israeli, where are his parents from? I look at the men on the patrols – one is from Russia, one from Ethiopia, one from Morocco, and only one from Israel. Look at the Palestinian patrol – we are all from here, our parents and our grand parents are from here. How am I supposed to feel about them?

Q: Where are you from?

A: My village is ten minutes away from here. The first time I was in Israel, I was there for ten hours. This time the Israeli DCO commander arranged for me to go to my sister's wedding and I stayed for one week. I traveled all over – (his eyes light up with joy as he describes) – from Naharia, to Acco, to Haifa, Tiberias, Rosh Hanikra, Natanya, Caesaria. The land was so beautiful – it is my land – my country. I want to feel the *zaatar* (thyme) in my hands.

Ibrahim interpreted that the land and country belong to him. I have not heard narratives that included stories of the Palestinian's pre-1948 history of mobility, immigrations and migrations. Rather deepening his claim of exclusive ownership, Ibrahim's narrative 'clarifies' that the presence of Jewish Israelis from diverse origins, such as Ethiopia, Russia and Morocco was proof of the Palestinians' superior position as the native born – the true native. The claim of authority over the land, an ultimate belonging to the land, reflected the logic in which the current system of forces had minimal historical claim. Perception of the field within a hierarchy of belonging to the land defined positions, and when these perceptions shifted so did the stakes.

Palestinian officers emphasized their compromise over and over again. Palestinian officers talked of dreaming and they claimed an equivalence of

memory and loss. ‘If the Jews could dream for 2000 years, why should the Palestinian not be able to dream for 50’ (Nadim, Palestinian DCO Officer, Tulkarem), i.e. since the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948. They spoke of their love of all the land, ‘from Naharia, to Acco, to Haifa, Tiberias, Rosh Hanikra, Natanya, Caesaria,’ and its majestic beauty (Ibrahim, Palestinian JP Jeep Commander, Tulkarem). Their perception of aesthetics and longing sensuality for the ‘feel of *zaatar*’ was a claim to ownership. The land was as much part of their bodies as their bodies were part of the land. And thus, Ibrahim defined his position when he looked at Israeli Jews whose colors and languages suggested vague and remote origins of authenticity to the land. He thus described: ‘The land was so beautiful – it is my land – my country.’

Lastly, although my questions intended to probe the effectiveness of Joint Patrols as a confidence-building measure and a means to develop relations between former enemies, the consistent response given by Palestinian Patrolmen and Jeep Commanders focused on two themes: They either spoke of political injustice, or their work as a strategic political mission guided by military commands. In Ibrahim’s case, Israeli men were not human in the sense of relationship building or as breathing and feeling men, but served as symbolic representations of Israeli or Jewish discontinuity with the land. Only when persistently probed did they choose to describe Israelis and themselves within a relationship.

Emotion as a Negotiated Resource

The practical logic of emotions and emotion-work⁶⁹ compelled working relations to contend with a persistent need for improvisation. The men were, in fact, developing a ‘feel for the game.’⁷⁰ It was a ‘game’ previously unknown and specifically bound by its temporality. The ambiguity of the political process and built-in limitations imposed by the Oslo Agreements, structured the Joint Patrol project, restricted the tasks at hand and limited the ‘game’ to an exchange of emotional currency. There was very little chance for the men in the DCO and JP to effectively alter the social and political structures active in the field – in Areas A, B, and C. On the contrary, the soldiers and policemen were professionally obligated to maintain a relationship that bordered between the occupier and the occupied. Logistics of ‘access’ and sovereignty could not be fully modified but a commodity did emerge that was bartered back and forth between Israeli and Palestinian military men. The commodity was emotion itself.

Israeli officers exchanged ‘warm feelings’ for Palestinian cooperation, Israelis behaved with deference to strengthen Palestinians’ trust, Israelis provided a green blackboard to re-affirm Palestinian national pride, Israelis extended a handshake to re-affirm Palestinian honor and entice the desire to

coordinate security efforts. Emotions were themselves work-tasks that preceded and enabled the instrumental tasks of peacekeeping to be accomplished. Like the 'culture of guns' where Israelis modified military protocol to adapt to Palestinian demands, the Palestinian officers determined the direction of adaptive change in order for professional interaction to proceed.

A striking example of emotion as a negotiated resource is provided by a senior commander from the Palestinian Preventive Security Forces. He describes the violent events of September 1996 as an example of Palestinian cooperation and goodwill.

Nafith (Senior Palestinian Commander, Preventative Security Forces)
What happened in September was important for the peace process. It showed that we must have security coordination in the agreement. One of the reasons of its importance is to understand the feelings for each other: developing personal relations. When the Israelis gave us a good feeling of equality this made us want to help. For example, there was a wounded soldier that we took to our hospital; he was put in a Palestinian ambulance. I knew the commander and felt like I wanted to help. Joseph's tomb, as even your Intelligence Chief knows, is like a pimple that will burst. Because of our good relations we prevented all 41 soldiers inside the tomb from being massacred. Good human relations give us a common interest in the relationship. We feel part of the responsibility. There was no contact with the 41 soldiers inside the tomb for the Palestinian people had taken away their wireless. The Israeli soldiers had no contact with their commanders. So the first thing our soldiers did was to give the Israeli soldiers a wireless telephone. Our Forces had an agreement and, as a result, the Israeli army came in without any cover – Zvika, the commanding officer, went in with the four jeeps and without any military support. He was supposed to enter with air and ground cover (he tells me the Israeli military protocol!) but he didn't want to act as though he was re-conquering us. As a result four cars were burned and six soldiers were killed. Zvika was condemned whereas the head of the police was given medals – the one who entered against our agreement and who caused all the problems to escalate. We understood what Zvika was trying to do and it made us want to help.

Nafith describes desire as the singular professional drive because the Israeli commander refrained from ground and air cover, i.e. acts recognized as the re-occupation of Area A. The Israeli commander had protected Palestinians' political 'Face' by respecting their need and struggle for self determination. Palestinian military intervention was not based upon professional protocol, but moral sentiments and desire. Emotions were bartered in exchange for a working relationship transforming a cellular phone into a symbolic gesture of goodwill.

The technical instrument for communication and symbol for human contact expressed a mood of cooperation – an essential baseline for a working relationship. Yet the mood of goodwill was vulnerable to the political tensions outside. Israelis undermined the mood by security practices that reinforced the ‘feelings of an occupation army’ (Hani, Palestinian DCO Officer, Kalkilieh) through the presence of jeeps, checkpoints and armor. Israelis counteracted the atmosphere of what Ali (Palestinian DCO Officer, Ramallah) had hoped to create when he suggested to me that the JP jeep ‘should not be the color green like the army, but white or yellow like the color of a flower.’ The Joint Patrol and DCO were set as a sign of peace, to create a climate of hope and warmth, and not of a cold, heartless occupation. Such moods effected change and motivated cooperation.

Palestinian honor for the Israeli, not only created security through a relation of well-performed equivalence or gestures of goodwill, but also framed the acquisition and performance of honor and respect as a negotiation strategy. Palestinians enabled Israelis access if they properly performed deference. In other words, power was possessed by the ability to access the goods or resources, which were at stake in the field. Firm rules and boundaries that were reproduced by controlling who can talk to whom, as I learned at the Rest Stop, were also clearly delineated in the work of jeeps.

Hani (Palestinian DCO Officer, Kalkilieh)

It is the principle of honor. If I accept one time, then I will accept always. The military cars cannot do a patrol in Kalkilieh, they must not do a patrol. The military can only pass through like a passenger car. But sometimes they try to do a patrol alone. Sometimes they think that we do not give them the truth about Kalkilieh. And they like to see the things directly, alone. It is against the agreement.

For the Palestinians, if they allowed Israelis to break the honored agreement ‘one time’ they would establish a precedent for a potentially recurrent practice. Honor itself became an improvised practice intertwined with the Oslo Agreements. It was dependent upon what Illouz defines as a ‘reflexive selfhood’,⁷¹ which ‘demands at once dexterity with symbols and a fluency in transactions with persons.’ To succeed, telltales of military occupation had to be reworked, dismantled and transformed. Adaptive change was embodied through the technical finesse of empathy to anticipate the other man’s needs moods and reactions.

Rami (Israeli JP Jeep Commander, Kalkilieh)

They know how to respect us. They know how to respect our wants. Within the context of the missions – the same officer with whom you work, knows how to relate to you in a nice way, to talk very

respectfully – not to explode in the typical Israeli way where you can't finish a sentence without being interrupted. They give us honor but you must understand that they have honor to their own side. With them, their honor stops when they are insulted, or hurt – when their interests are hurt. But when you speak of honor – man to man they know how to treat you with respect and warmth.

While Israelis acknowledged Palestinian finesse in expressing warmth and respect, Palestinian officers talked about desperation where there was no 'peace in the air' (Hani, Palestinian DCO Officer, Kalkilieh). Emotions and politics were intertwined in a discourse of temperatures that, from the Palestinian perspective, lacked warmth. In sharp contrast, Palestinian temperament from the Israeli view was seen as an intangible vaporous substance, which could transform dangerously and instantaneously.

Emotions, Temperatures and Emotion Work

In lieu of the authentic or real, distinctions were made for strategies and techniques of practice. Skills to perform warmth reflected two tiers of meaning. On one level, 'warmth' constructed humanity. 'Warmth' reaffirmed Palestinian value and reconstituted Palestinian position as men and as Palestinians. Warmth shifted relations of power to achieve an equivalence of identity.

Second, distinctions between warm and cold practices distinguished a relationship based upon strategy from one based upon hope. Without the proper techniques, the performance of equivalence failed and with it came despair. In other words, the Joint Patrols created a zone where Israelis and Palestinians of equal rank were mutually accessible. However, failure to properly perform the relationship undermined equivalence and the ensuing construction of optimism. Warmth predicted a better future and as such, proper technique constituted hope.

Khalil (Palestinian RSC Commander)

Q: What were the problems before Netanyahu?

A: During Rabin, during the last government, the Oslo process was working to create a normal situation. There was hope among the Palestinian people that we were coming to a 'New Age' – that there was a new time. We made the redeployment together – we were hopeful that the 2nd and 3rd redeployments would work the same way. We worked day and night and we were happy to see the cities without occupation. We faced the Palestinians who were against the peace process, like Hamas. At that time, they were stronger but the people were with Oslo.

Now, Hamas is weaker but the people are pessimistic. Hamas and other groups are becoming stronger. They tried to stop our peaceful track but we faced them during the three years. But since the Netanyahu government came, numerous obstacles have been put forward to undermine the peace process. These make our feelings bad and our work difficult.

The hope for a 'New Age' was reconstructed daily through warm relations. Indeed, before anything else, as Barbalet identifies '... emotions must be understood within the structural relations of power and status which elicit them. This makes emotion a social-structural as much if not more than a cultural thing.'⁷² In other words, the need for warmth, even among senior officers at the DCO, was bound to the political realities of occupier-occupied and the struggle to reconstitute the relationship. Simultaneously, cultural disparities co-existed within a time-bound military frame that created labile temperatures subject to precarious winds of change. Consequently, in order to succeed in the work of security cooperation, men required skill, finesse and knowledge.

Faruq (Palestinian DCO Commander, Ramallah)

Q: What do Israelis do that would be insulting, problems that have taken time for them to understand?

A: Like when they do this (and he presented the soles of his shoes in my direction). The traditions between the Palestinians and the Israelis are different. Like when they rest their foot over their knee.

Q: Yes, the Israelis say it is no problem for them.

A: But for us it is a problem. People who work with us, should be like us. When they don't shake hands. When they don't behave warmly. When they come to us, we make them welcome, we make them coffee, welcome. What we have, we offer them. But for them, it is not the same. It's cold. Very cold.

Palestinian hospitality was not asserted, as argued by Rabinowitz in his study of Palestinian Israelis in Nazareth.⁷³ Rather, hospitality was a commodity, expected to be reciprocated as an indicator of equivalence. Israelis needed to appropriately perform according to Palestinian standards of expressive behavior because, as Faruq identifies, 'people who work with us, should be like us.' His requirement possessed a symbolic logic of practice since 'to behave like us' was imbued with the recognition of symbolic equality and the shift from the behavior of an occupier to the behavior of a partner in peace. Israelis, however, saw Palestinian warmth as transient and explosive. Emotions of warmth and friendship could appear to be present at one moment and transform to cold brutal anger or heated violence the next. To counteract

this tension, Israelis protected themselves with an emotional armor that arises with ‘disquieting uncertainties’ against ‘dangerous needs’.⁷⁴ The Israeli need to trust Palestinians replaced expressions of warmth with a technical tone for professional practice and ethics. And the Israeli policemen who served in the Joint Patrol expressed these feelings openly and directly.

Mati (Israeli Joint Patrolman, Kalkilieh)

We do it because we have to, because we are required. It is our work. We don’t have to get too close to them – not to create a chaotic mess.

In order to keep the relations neutral and comfortable, an Israeli commander describes his emotional labor.⁷⁵ Relations must avoid tensions, and thus warmth and friendliness during times of political tension were controlled. Food, drink, body comfort and family became neutral arenas for safe contact.

Oren (Israeli JP Jeep Commander, Ramallah)

For example, in Ras El Amoud and Har Homa and all the mess that was there, I stood to the side. I knew what was happening but I just didn’t want to talk. He knows that I know and I know that he knows that I know. I guide the discussion so that it doesn’t get into politics. ‘How are you, how are your children, this isn’t fun, it’s hot here’ and there I end the discussion. Not too much. Maybe we will tell a joke here, eat, go out and buy something to eat because there is partial trust. Yet it is not complete.

For the Israeli, the willingness to engage in warm relations was inversely related to a felt threat. Expressions of warmth by Palestinian officers were seen through a political undertone. Israelis held their warm emotions in check precisely because of the fear generated by the Palestinians’ increased power. They anticipated that, once given the opportunity, what had been once warm relations could turn from cold to a searing anger if the opportunity required. It was an emotional shifting, whether strategic or spontaneous, that posed an impending threat of physical harm tied to changes in relations of power.

Oren (Israeli JP Jeep Commander, Ramallah)

I believe that during the final agreement, if they have an airport, I am sure, not just believe but am positive that they will bring guns and things that will put us in danger. Because between us there is the issue of war and they want to show us their power. Now we are in control, but no one wants to be controlled and they will do everything in their power to ‘turn the wheel’ to be equally powerful or more powerful. I trust them during the patrol because I have no choice – I can’t be eight hours full of distrust and also he cannot. It is an agreement between us, without talking, between us. He stays to the side with his soldiers and I stay to

the side with mine – that’s it. ‘Hello, hello, how are you doing’ and that’s it. And that is where it all ends.

Oren ties volatility to relations of symmetry and the struggle to ‘turn the wheel.’ As such, emotions shift and change according to climates and winds. Once the balance of power will change, he believes that his Palestinian counterpart will be dangerous. He saw himself as holding back the tide of an inevitable tidal wave. And although emotional control by the commander, as Ben-Ari argues, is a familiar strategy found in armies that ‘attemp(t) to cultivate and regulate the emotions of troops’⁷⁶ managing the volatility of Palestinian emotions was a work project that Israeli officers could not control. Palestinian emotions reflected back upon a hunger for normalcy.

Nafith (Senior Palestinian Commander, Preventative Security Forces)
The Palestinian soldier must be relaxed – not tense all the time. When he sees an Israeli, he will shoot him when he is forbidden to go home to his wife or his family.

The desire for a normal life, where one can see wife and family, justified the radical shift from a professional demeanor to one that is ‘natural.’ Personal frustrations – albeit politically generated – if not eased could lead a soldier to shoot. In his argument, Nafith elevates the ‘emotional climate’⁷⁷ to be the central key to peace – despite the fact that in so doing, he confirms Israeli fear that Palestinian policemen lack professional discipline. But it was precisely the importance of emotions that supports my argument for the strategic importance of building an ‘emotional climate.’ For the Palestinian soldiers, Israelis work without ‘heart.’

Nadim (Palestinian DCO Officer, Tulkarem)
When I came here after Oslo, I wanted to start a new page, and I looked for warm friendships. In Gaza, I tried to be friends with them and make life like friends. But there was no communication with them. There were a few where there were good relations. I was at an Israeli wedding in Kfar Saba. But mostly, many of the people work like in diplomatic relations, since after work there is nothing. It makes you feel very bad. The smile and handshake like a diplomat, not like friends. If I see a smiling soldier, I will love him. We will create a friendship. Some people look like honey with their eyes and their smiles. When an Israeli is smiling, he is good – it creates a good friendship. But if he does not look at us, if he does not smile, we will not like him. A person will not smile and stab you at the same time. When the colonel was killed in Gaza (during the September Tunnel Incident of 1996) I lost a friend – my close friend was killed.

For us we fought against the other but we don't know the other. Only the men who had been prisoners know Israelis and the young ones who had thrown stones during the *Intifada*. For the young ones it is interesting for them. They say that they: threw stones at you two years ago and now they are working with you. But the Israeli does not want to know him.

Nadim appears to search for deep, not surface, acting. Consequently, the cold 'diplomat' performs emotions as a surface strategy to accomplish a professional role. In Nadim's case, as in other examples, the capacity to express 'warm friendships' need not correspond with trust but with the willingness to affirm a new political reality embodied by warm relations.

Hani (Palestinian DCO Officer, Kalkilieh)

When I was in Algeria, if you said the word Israeli to me, we would have to destroy all of them immediately. There wasn't such a thing as talking to an Israeli. Now, we sit together, we work together, we eat lunch together. There is a big change in the way of thinking, I know.

The Israelis treated the inhabitants of the land as if the Palestinians came from the moon. What were they called? They were without a name – they were without an identity. Even today it persists.

Palestinians talked about desperation where there was no warmth. When they came from their Diaspora, they expected to 'see peace in the air'. Peace would be felt through the day-to-day interaction between Israelis. To be treated 'well,' to be treated with respect reproduced a political stance that reaffirmed and thus, reconstituted Palestinian national identity.

Masks across Cultures

To conceptualize mask wearing was to interpret not only that contradictory emotions lie behind the mask, but also that they should not. The mask served a fake representation of feelings. To feel fear while acting warm and friendly established an irreconcilable contradiction between the surface and the deep. But in order to describe the contradiction, social actors had to assume that surface and deep both existed and should be synchronized. Israeli cultural ethos of *dugriut*⁷⁸, of speaking one's mind forcefully and directly without embellishments or concern for others is 'positive' Face needs⁷⁹ assumes the Western notion of sincerity.⁸⁰ The apparent lack of mask-wearing that I found among the Palestinians would suggest that no such assumption was made. Rather, their performance of cooperation was generally framed as instrumental logic, i.e. 'peace is our strategy,' within a general ethos of *musayara*, '(which) is in the blood of every Arab person.'⁸¹

Musayara supports the desire to maintain harmonious social relations by 'going with' or 'accompanying' another during interaction. Its practice can be seen as embellishments, or even as ingratiating 'Arabesques.' Doing *musayara* establishes cooperation rather than conflict, and mutuality rather than self-assertion but it can also serve longer-range 'political goals'.⁸² While gestures of flattery can constitute *mudjamala*, *musayara* involves interactions where something of the 'self' has been 'given up.' It involves a degree of concession that would not transgress what Bourdieu notes as the 'point of honor.'⁸³ For this reason, the Palestinian 'pre-occupation' with honor was effectively a call to maintain their cultural ethos, to enable them to 'do *musayara*.'

The art of mask-wearing, or surface acting was not considered false but an expected and necessary technique to pursue social relations. Mask-wearing protected *Khater*, the 'fragile, tender and extremely sensitive constituent of the individual.'⁸⁴ *Khater*, as described by Palestinian Anthropologist Qleibo, is 'the most private, almost idiosyncratic, aspect of the individual (that) must be recognized and respected through gentle words and kind actions. You cannot refuse a person's request because of his *khater*, *ashan khatroh*. Moreover, one feels guilty if one says something that hurts someone's *khater*, *kassar khatroh* (literally broke his *khater*).'⁸⁵ The need for proper performance, from the Palestinian perspective, was itself an authentic gesture of protecting another's *khater* and this appears to bypass the concern over the discontents of mask-wearing. Outer performance was not described as an activity to be consistent with inner intent. Contrasts between public and private ways of being were not presumed as illegitimate or a basis for fakeness, but considered appropriate, expected or at least understood.

The bold directness of Israeli *dugriut* met the subtle nuances of Palestinian *musayara*. This may help explain the most common refrain that I heard from Israelis, regardless of religious background, towards Palestinians: 'Respect them but be wary and on-guard of them.' While the location of the need to be 'on-guard' may be based upon *musayara* or the 'arabesques' of what Caplan describes as the 'fabulations' of Arab communication style,⁸⁶ it does not fully explain distrust as a consequence of the convergence of cultural communication styles. Israeli Jews saw themselves and their Palestinian counterparts involved in a multi-layered performance of hidden intents and meanings behind masks of congeniality.

Israeli policemen on the Joint Patrol spoke of hypocrisy and fake disguises of warmth and nicety while assuaging the tensions of cocked guns, verbal teasings, hand and foot curses and other forms of provocations – including physical violence. Their sense of mask-wearing was intensified and bound to their own embodiment of contradictory body practices that consisted of simultaneous peacebuilding and military occupation. But even if they were to release the reigns of control by relinquishing their pervasive access to

Palestinian bodies and space, they saw entrusting Palestinians with the agency of self-determination as an untenable project. The Palestinian's cultural prerogative to behave with warmth as a strategic asset intensified Israeli distrust.

The 'twist' is that while Israeli patrolmen feared the lack of an underlying Palestinian professional ethic or morality not related to the Arabesques of 'doing *musayara*,' Palestinian commanders also demanded that Israelis perform professionally and instrumentally. Indeed, the Palestinian commanders contested the Israeli's professional work. Palestinian professionals expected the instrumental tasks of police-work to be made accurately. Israelis who did not write reports or illegally entered Areas A or B in pursuit of criminals – an infraction of the Oslo Accords – were confronted during conflict resolution sessions. Palestinian officers, particularly those in leadership positions at the DCO and in higher command, were trained in military academies where they acquired and worked to implement their value for military discipline. Yet despite the instrumental and professional complaints lodged against their Israeli counterparts, Palestinian policemen, soldiers and officers sought Israeli intent, embedded in the instrumental tasks of daily work. It was the quality of instrumental practice that bound Israeli trustworthiness and professionalism.

Israelis and Palestinians were looking for professionalism and appeared to be searching for the same elements in each other, yet their understanding of instrumental practice diverged. The Israeli team conceptualized a distinction between rationality and emotions. They contrasted the Palestinian team who generally recognized emotions as a totality, which legitimized its use as a commodity of instrumental practice.

The symbolic domains arose out of the quality of instrumental practice and these could not be detached from the technical task of peacekeeping. On the contrary, the emotions that symbols evoked became critical and essential aspects of agency. Flags at equal height, colors that reflected both peoples, or space of equal size created a mood where gates remained open to both sides and handshakes could be mutually exchanged. Emotionally evocative symbols not only signaled a change in relations but also supported standards of 'Face.' They created an emotional climate conducive for interaction and peace-building.

Indeed, the success of the Palestinian JP and DCO was their ability to withstand the forces of resistance building among the Palestinian people against the military occupation and the expansion of Jewish settlements while actively and publicly engaged in a professional relationship with members of the occupation forces. As both Palestinian soldiers/policemen and political representatives of Palestinian national pride they met the impossible task of peacekeeping. Consequently, emotional-labor and emotion-work became instrumental tasks that underlined the process of security cooperation and

trust-building. When a car-accident in Area A between an Israeli and Palestinian would call the JP into action, numerous symbolic details would mobilize emotion-work between the men. The speed in which the jeeps traveled, the distance between the jeeps, who would lead and who would follow, who would take the report and who would write down the details, who would speak first and who would listen became details negotiated and contested by the policemen. Israeli ‘arrogance’ was symbolic of their occupation. While the jeeps of the Joint Patrol may have initially been signs of peace they became signifiers of the occupation.

Mask-wearing then was both a strategy and a technique revealing the Israeli Jewish conceptualization that compartmentalizes politics and military practice from emotions. Israelis at the DCO or on the JP may have recognized the emotional consequences of checkpoints from the Palestinian perspective but could not justify them because their concept of security was immutable. The priority to capture one terrorist or one car filled with illegal munitions justified the ‘inconvenience’ of checkpoints for thousands of Palestinians. But the long- or even short-term effect of checkpoints was not described as having direct consequences on the emotional climate within the JP or DCO. According to Nadim, Israelis ‘think without feeling.’

Druze Israelis possessed insider’s knowledge. They shared both the Palestinian and Israeli system of framing interaction and authenticity. Thus, when Palestinian officers were asked directly to speak ‘the *dugri*, the truth,’ they understood that ‘the slipperiness and ambiguity attending the exercise of *musayara* cannot be tolerated.’⁸⁷ Knowledge of two operating systems, one perceived as false and mask-like and the other described as strategic and instrumental, privileged the Israeli Druze commanders, soldiers and policemen. As cultural mediators, they were empowered with the agency associated with interpretation. Their erudition was fully embodied both through subtle nuances of movement and through the symbolic and emotional constructs associated with the Arabic language. Druze military men possessed the capacity to view the world and constitute it. Their multi-tiered knowledge, experienced as feelings, understood as conceptualizations and manifested as movement expression placed them in a special position to regulate agency. They possessed the enabling mechanism to place templates of meaning on day-to-day improvised relations,⁸⁸ a body of knowledge essential to the daily negotiation of relations on the Israeli–Palestinian Joint Patrols.

Non-Mediated Peacekeeping: Summary and Implications

The Joint Patrols (JP) and the District Coordination Offices (DCO) succeeded to stabilize, rather than destabilize the Oslo period through their formal and informal structures. Great efforts were made to ensure the success of this

unprecedented experiment in 'non-mediated peacekeeping,' despite contradictory political forces and primitive organizational management that undermined, if not directly opposed, their work. Although many problems existed on the ground, particularly on the Joint Patrols, security cooperation was nevertheless a sign of hope, a mechanism for the continuous flow of information, a strategy to reduce tensions in the field, a technique to develop working relations of trust and a means to build shared professional standards for future relations.

Two choices can be made vis-à-vis the Joint Patrols for a future peace process and military security cooperation. The first, is to disband them. The other, is to make them more sophisticated and capable to support adaptive change. The latter option is outlined below in three parts. Part one summarizes the efficacy of the Joint Patrols; part two recommends specific modifications and part three raises key points related to third-party intervention by foreign forces.

1. Summary of key effects and utility of the Joint Patrols

- a. Increased security.** The JP created the reason for daily contact at the DCO. They supported intelligence needs for both sides through a constant flow of information and enabled Palestinian and Israeli messages to be transferred to higher ranking decision-makers. Furthermore, the JP became an ongoing site for the negotiation, improvisation and building of relations that created working levels of trust through non-mediated conflict resolution sessions and other improvised informal practices. Although violence erupted both in the field and between the men on the Joint Patrols, the professional and political mandates to coordinate efforts compelled change and an adaptive process to occur within the respective military organizations that deployed them. The adaptive process not only enhanced goodwill and a professional ethic but also enabled field commanders to modify and adjust their security practices with appropriate and effective responses.
- b. Magnified asymmetric relations and impediments to peace-building.** The JP reenacted a microcosm of the conflict. They also reproduced the asymmetric access to territory and citizens and manifested imbalances in power. Simultaneously, as a security instrument to support political transition and the re-alignment of territorial control, they attempted to create relations of 'as-if' equivalence through the negotiation and success of their daily relations. As such, the JP created a site to analyze impediments to peace-building and constabulary effectiveness. Consequently, the JP

provided *an intelligence focal point* – a self-contained research database useful for military analysts and policy makers

- c. **Identified the emotional/socio/political climate.** The JP was *a strategic 'litmus paper'* that could have been used to monitor the mood of the field and pre-empt causes of social unrest and violence. As such, the JP could have provided vital information for both sides to assess the political, emotional and social moods of the Palestinian and Israeli people. This information potentially could have impacted and modified military and political policies and procedures to support peacebuilding.

2. Recommendations to modify Joint Patrols

- a. **The JP must be established for a defined time period as a tool of an Interim phase.** The JP should exist for a limited period with a clearly defined political endpoint. In the Israeli–Palestinian case, an endpoint must delimit borders that determine a boundary line perceived by both sides as just, fair and secure. Over the course of the interim period the Joint Patrols should gradually draw back to patrol along the border and be replaced by Joint civil police units (see 3b below).
- b. **The JP and DCO must see that their work has positive consequences in the field.** See 3b below.
- c. **The JP must have equal access to all citizens.** Unequal access to all citizens intensifies asymmetry and instability. The mandate that enabled Israeli security forces to interrogate Palestinians in Areas B and C, particularly when the Palestinian security forces were present at the scene, undermined the Palestinian security force's authority and control. Furthermore, such security practices intensified the Palestinian community's will to resist Israeli presence. All security forces should manage their respective citizens, i.e. Palestinians manage Palestinian citizens and Israelis manage Israeli citizens – throughout the jointly patrolled area. Incremental Israeli withdrawal of Areas A, B, and C, i.e. would be reflected in the operations of the JP which would effectively become Joint Mobile Units throughout the West Bank. Equivalence of access should provide the guidelines for the operative principles of the JP – an achievable goal based upon incremental steps taken during the interim period. Further study and assessment is needed vis-à-vis the Joint Patrols/Joint Mobile Units and the specific

approach of incremental withdrawal until the conclusion of the transitional period.

- d. The JP must be a sign of peace and not of the occupation.** Overt symbols of peace impact upon the emotional climate that drives social actors. Everything must be identical between the two teams, i.e. the same clothes, jeeps, weapons, cellular telephones, etc. Only the jeep's insignia indicates that one is Israeli and the other Palestinian. Otherwise, the jeeps should be painted a distinct color to distinguish them as the peace patrol unit. In other words, numerous symbols reinforce both joint thinking and joint work among the men and the community with whom they are in contact. However, the impending danger exists that symbols of equivalence will be interpreted as yet another ploy of an occupation if one group experiences asymmetry vis-à-vis access to territorial space and individual citizens.
- e. The DCO must be directly responsible for the JP as a specially designed unit under their command and training.** There are professional advantages for using forces from the National Guard and the border police on the Joint Patrol. An alternative option may include civil police. Additionally, it may be advantageous to place only officers on the jeeps, one from the army, one from the border police and one from the civil police. During the Oslo period, JP policemen underwent minimal selection or training for coordinated efforts. They were not prepared for the mission through language or cross-culture studies. Organizationally, Israeli policemen were assigned the mutually exclusive tasks of security cooperation and general security. Lastly, from a human resources perspective it was impossible to deepen the relationship between the two teams. Not only were the differences between the two teams tremendous, but also the disparities within the teams made achieving mutual understanding impossible.
- f. The JP can establish an equalizing mechanism on the ground to establish law and order for two democratic states.** The Joint Patrols have the potential to evolve as a non-mediated constabulary force whose agents are mandated to protect principles of civil liberties and freedom determined and enforced by both countries. Two jeeps could be replaced by one jeep once the transition from a military to a constabulary project was completed, e.g. after a three-year period. Therefore, the JP could provide an equalizing mechanism on the ground to establish law and order for two democratic states. Furthermore, the JP

could support a legal and professional code of ethics and resemble, in principle, the cooperative legal forces that operate on the island of Ireland and in the Basque country between Spain and France.

g. The Joint Patrols/DCO can be a direct line to political policy and negotiators. The unique focal point of the JP/DCO as a microcosm of the emotional/political climate suggests that they can serve as an intelligence site to brief politicians and policy makers. A mechanism needs to be created to support direct and consistent channels to political decision-makers. The mechanism may include third-party intervention.

3. **Third-party intervention: primary concerns and recommendations**

a. Monitors: The DCO reduced violence created solidarity among comrades-in-arms and supported the constant exchange of information. To place a third-party as ‘judge’ would dislodge the direct, improvised and informal contact between Israeli and Palestinian commanders. Direct contact increased knowledge, reduced uncertainty and enabled a mutually adaptive process to occur between Israeli and Palestinian security forces in relation to the field. A ‘judge’ would, by definition, frame their relationship as untrustworthy, and enhance the struggle to prove one or the other as being more right or righteous in the eyes of the ‘judge.’ During the Oslo period, at no time did any Palestinian or Israeli commander indicate that a third-party was desirable. However, the tragic turn of events following October 2000 created fresh and bitter memories and mutual distrust that will probably require third-party intervention before the gradual return to non-mediated peacekeeping.

b. Judges/monitors: Two stages

aa. Stage One: Given the intense years of violence and terrorism since September 2000, field reports from senior Israeli and Palestinian military commanders indicate the need for third-party intervention. The reason given is the lack of mutual trust – whether by ill will, professional inability or political resistance – to fulfill the agreement. A third-party force should have the mandate to mediate and supervise the first stage of the ceasefire and peace process.

bb. Stage Two: Once both sides agree that the third-party force is unnecessary, direct non-mediated peacekeeping could resume. Should monitors remain, they could serve as an instrument to hear the pulse of the field and report back to the political bodies in charge of territorial and civilian policies. Given the genuine commitment to perform security cooperation, a judge would not be needed to solve problems by looking ‘downward’ at the ‘non-mediated peacekeepers.’ Rather, the recommendation is that the ‘judge’ should look ‘upward’ towards the political decision-makers. The monitor should make political recommendations to directly influence governmental instruments according to the phases outlined in the ‘Road Map’ that adjusts policy to the needs of the field. These may include political policy over the military’s territorial dominion, the civil infrastructure responsible for law and order or political instruments such as the media. Monitors should have equal access to both the Israeli and Palestinian sides. Logistical concerns include the following questions: How would monitors manage their power to effect change? What form of punishment or incentive would they have at their disposal?

Social actors will invariably struggle to realign relations of power. Unless Israeli and Palestinian sides see tangible progress towards greater equivalence and mutual legitimacy – both as security practice and political self-determination – civil resistance, violence and strife will persist regardless of peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts.

NOTES

1. On 13 September 1993 the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government marked the first symbolic gesture and technical step to transition from armed conflict to peace. In principle, the Palestinians retracted their previous position of an undivided Palestine for one that would consist of 22 per cent of their original claim, i.e. pre-partitioned, 1947 Palestine. On 4 May 1994 the first Oslo Agreements were signed. They were legally titled the ‘Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area’ and signed in Cairo by the government of the State of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization. While a Joint Israeli–Palestinian Coordination and Cooperation Committee for mutual security purposes was established by the Declaration of Principles, the later agreement explicitly designed the infrastructure of security cooperation and formed the first Joint Patrols.
2. Transitional space is a term introduced here to describe territorial space whose boundaries remain undefined during a transitional political period. Implications for security cooperation draw from anthropological theory pertaining to ritual performance and rites of passage. These ideas will be explored further in an upcoming article.
3. On 29 September 2000 at 6.00 am a Palestinian joint patrolman – a five-year veteran – shot and killed his Israeli counterpart. It was the morning after Ariel Sharon – political rival of

the then current Prime Minister – visited the Temple Mount on 28 September 2000. The event and subsequent dissolution of the Joint Patrols marked the end of the Oslo peace process – a prediction made by both Israelis and Palestinians involved in security cooperation. Indeed, the events began a sequence of renewed bloodshed that continues to persist as of the writing of this article.

4. During the negotiations in Oslo, the Israelis proposed to the Palestinians to work jointly on security matters, indicating that they were prepared to either reduce or eliminate their control over portions of the territories. As such, security cooperation would provide a test of trustworthiness and sincerity of intent to make peace. The cooperative project would give Israel the assurances that relinquishing military control of the West Bank would not endanger Israeli lives. It would provide Palestinians the assurances that they would soon fulfill their quest for an independent Palestinian state. Security cooperation began immediately, comingling formal professional relations and binding Palestinian and Israeli realities into a daily partnership. The Israeli lawyer Yoel Zinger, describes how he ‘took the detailed chapter from the Lebanese agreement and adapted it to the Palestinian environment with the advice and feedback of the Israeli army’ (personal communication). He then did the same with the Palestinians. According to Yezid Sayigh, who recalls the negotiations as a member of the 1993 Palestinian negotiations team, ‘we essentially took the Israeli manual and modified it with respect to the civilian police and to the rules and regulations under the legal code. These additions were based on PLO practice with respect to its organization and command’ (Sayigh, personal communication). In effect, the Palestinian team built upon their prior experience in security cooperation and specifically with the ‘*Dawriyya Mushtaraka*’ they had developed in Jordan and Lebanon.
5. It must be noted that there were inherent and profound disadvantages to conducting the field study. Despite having received the required political and military approval to conduct the research, Palestinian patrolmen and commanders were less accessible to me than their Israeli counterparts. To counteract this deficit I spent much more time with Palestinian officers at the DCO. In contrast to the multiple and spontaneous opportunities to engage Israeli policemen in conversation, the same was not the case among the Palestinians. The Palestinian base – a former Israeli military base – was located within the fully autonomous Palestinian city. I never saw the inside, nor was able to wander freely around the base to ‘catch’ a policeman for an informal interview at his barracks, on a stairway, or after his freezing early morning briefing. Language also worked against me. Although I could speak Hebrew with Palestinian Joint Patrolmen, my knowledge of Arabic was limited. Thus, the richness of my field data came through interviews with Palestinian officers at the DCO, who spoke English fluently, and observations and discussions while I sat on the patrols, rested with the men on street-corners, observed conflict resolution sessions or drank coffee in their offices. Therefore, although the depth of interviews with Palestinian Jeep Policemen is significantly reduced, I was still able to obtain direct data that I then combined with indirect data from other Palestinian and Israeli sources.
6. Generally, the areas of interest examined in the peacekeeping literature study the effects of military cultures cross-cultural settings: Donna Winslow, ‘Military Culture in Complex Cultural Encounters’ (unpublished paper: University of Ottawa 1998); Ann Fitz-Gerald, ‘Multinational land force interoperability: Meeting the challenge of different cultural backgrounds in Chapter VI peace support operations’, *Choices* 8/3 (2002) pp.1–22; civil-military relations: Lyle Goldstein, ‘General John Shalikashvili and the Civil-Military Relations of Peacekeeping’ *Armed Forces and Society* 26/3 (2000) pp.387–411; Volker Franke, ‘Duty, Honor, Country: The Social Identity of West Point Cadets’ *Armed Forces and Society* 26/2 (2000) pp.175–202; James Burk, ‘Recent Trends in Civil–Military Relations’ *The Tocqueville Review* 17/1 (2000), pp.83–106; John Kleinig, *The Ethics of Policing* (New York: Cambridge University Press 1996); the morale and preparation for warriors of peace: David Segal and Brian Reed, ‘Combat Soldiers’ Attitudes Towards Peacekeeping’ (unpublished paper. International Sociological Association 1998); Eva Johansson and Lars Andersson, ‘Experiential Assessment of Factors Affecting Morale in Swedish Peacekeeping Forces’ (unpublished paper: International Sociological Association 1998); Franz Kernic,

'The Austrian Experience in Preparing Warriors for Peace' (unpublished paper International Sociological Association 1998); identity and the challenges of peacekeeping in the post-cold war era: Franklin Pinch, 'Change Issues for Canadian Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era' (unpublished paper: International Sociological Association 1998); Stephen Randall, 'Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era: The United Nations and the Cambodian Elections of 1993' *Contemporary Security Policy* 16/2 (1995) pp.174–91; and the social and psychological effects of peacekeeping: Brett Litz, Susan Orsillo, Matthew Friedman, Peter Ehlich and Alfonso Batres, 'Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Associated with Peacekeeping Duty in Somalia for US Military Personnel' *The American Journal of Psychiatry* 154/2 (1997) pp.178–84; Frabrizio Battistelli, 'Peacekeeping and the Postmodern Soldier' *Armed Forces and Society* 23/3 (1997) pp.467–84. More recently, feminist viewpoints have raised questions, such as women's meanings of peacebuilding, Susan McKay and Cheryl de-la-Rey: 'Women's Meanings of Peacebuilding in Post-Apartheid South Africa'. *Peace and Conflict* 7/3 (2001) pp.227–42; and women's roles in peacekeeping: Radha Kumar, 'Women's Peacekeeping during Ethnic Conflict and Post-Conflict Reconstruction' *NWSA Journal* 13/2 (2001) pp.68–73; Judith Stiehm, 'Women, Peacekeeping and Peacemaking: Gender Balance and Mainstreaming', *International Peacekeeping* 8/2 (2001) pp.39–48; Henry F. Carey, 'Women and Peace and Security: The Politics of Implementing Gender Sensitivity Norms in Peacekeeping', *International Peacekeeping*(2001) pp.49–68; Mary Jane Fox, 'The Idea of Women in Peacekeeping: Lysistrata and Antigone', *International Peacekeeping*8/2 (2001) pp.9–22; Gerard DeGroot, 'A Few Good Women: Gender Stereotypes, the Military and Peacekeeping', *International Peacekeeping* 8/2 (2001) pp.23–38'; Kari Karame, ' Military Women in Peace Operations: Experiences of the Norwegian Batalion in UNIFIL 1978–98', *International Peacekeeping*8/2 (2000) pp.85–96. Ethnographic studies have examined the negotiations of relations within distinct military forces: Eyal Ben-Ari and Edna Lomsky-Feder, "'The People in Uniform" to "Different Uniforms for the People": Professionalism, diversity and the Israel Defense Forces' in Jan van der Meulen and Joseph Soeters (ed.), *The Management of Diversity in the Armed Forces* (Tilburg: Tilburg University Press 1999) or as a negotiated order: Donna Winslow, 'Peacekeeping as a Disintegrative Force' (unpublished paper: International Sociological Association 1998), however little if any research has been conducted on the micro-level negotiation of relations between peacekeeping forces.

7. Franz Kermic, 'The Austrian Experience in Preparing Warriors for Peace' (unpublished paper: International Sociological Association 1998).
8. Pierre Bourdieu and Loic Wacquant, *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology* (Chicago, IL: Chicago Univeristy Press 1992) p.101.
9. Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1977).
10. Bourdieu and Wacquant (note 8) p.119.
11. Simona Santoro, 'Le incognite della cooperazione' in R. Ragionier and Friedberg O. di Schmidt (eds) *Culture e conflitti nel Mediterraneo* (Triest: Asterios Editore 2003).
12. Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflict* (Malden, MA: Polity Press 1999).
13. See Walid Khalidi, *All that Remains: The Palestinian Villages Occupied and Depopulated by Israel in 1948* (Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies 1992); Meron Benvenisti, *Intimate Enemies: Jews and Arabs in a Shared Land* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press 1995); Abraham Sela, *The Decline of the Arab–Israeli Conflict: Middle Eastern Politics and the Quest for Regional Order* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press 1998); Benny Morris, *Israel's Border Wars, 1949–1956* (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1997); Mar Tessler, *A History of the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press 1994). For an excellent bibliography see Laura Z. Eisenberg and Neil Caplan, *Negotiating Arab–Israeli Peace* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press 1998).
14. For a history of Jewish Diaspora see Lionel Kochan, *The Jew and his History* (London: Macmillan Press 1977); Alexis Rubin (ed.), *Scattered Among the Nations Documents Affecting Jewish History, 1949–1975* (Toronto: Wall & Emerson 1993).

15. For a history of the Palestinian Diaspora see Ghada Karmi, Eugene Cotran and Ian Gilmour, *The Palestinian Exodus, 1948–1998* (London: Ithica Press 2000); Ibrahim Abu-Lughod (ed.), *The Transformation of Palestine* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press 1971); Khalidi (note 11 Benny Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947–1949* (London: Cambridge University Press 1987).
16. Khalidi (note 13) p.9.
17. The Al Nakba in Arabic means ‘the Catastrophe’ and is remembered by the Palestinian people on May 14 – Israel’s Independence day.
18. “Oslo I” – AGREEMENT ON THE GAZA STRIP AND THE JERICHO AREA. Cairo, May 4, 1994.
19. The term *Aliyah* is used not only to describe one’s ‘going up’ to read from the Torah during a Jewish prayer service, but also to describe the ‘going up’ to Israel. Thus, one who leaves Israel ‘goes down.’ The association of prayer, movement through space and belonging to the land is deeply embedded in the Jewish Israeli narrative. It situates the Jew not only belonging to the land, but also spiritually elevated by living on it. For a history of Zionism see: S. Almog, *Zionism and History: The Rise of a New Jewish Consciousness* (New York: St Martin’ Press 1987); W. Laquer, *A History of Zionism* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1972); S. N. Eisenstadt, *The Transformation of Israeli Society* (London: Wiedenfeld & Nicolson 1985); David Myers, *Re-Inventing the Jewish Past: European Intellectuals and the Zionist Return to History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1995).
20. Adding to the diversity of the Jewish population, Muslims, Christians, and Druze, a non-Muslim Arab community, are citizens of the State of Israel and serve in the Israeli Defense Forces. They too served on the Joint Patrols. For more on Israeli demographics see the Israeli Bureau of Statistics. Data taken from two census records for the population breakdown between the Jewish and Druze community are the following: in 1997: Jewish – 4,720,000; Druze – 96,700 and in 2000: Jewish – 4,955,000 ; Druze – 103,800. Christians and Muslims comprise approximately 20 per cent of the total population of the State of Israel.
21. J. Comaroff and J. L. Comaroff, ‘Naturing the Nation: Aliens, Apocalypse and the Postcolonial State, *Hagar* 1/1 (2000) p.7.
22. “Oslo II” – *Israeli–Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip* (Washington, DC: 1995) pp.34–39
23. See Uri Savir, *The Process* (New York: Random House 1998).
24. While the Oslo Agreements established the Palestinian Authority, the Palestinian Authority called itself the Palestinian National Authority as a precursor to the establishment of a Palestinian state.
25. Oslo II (note 22) p.34.
26. Oslo II (note 22) p.35.
27. Oslo II (note 22) p.36.
28. I have not visited the DCO in the Gaza Strip but was told by a former Israeli DCO commander that no fences separated Palestinian and Israeli sides of the two DCOs there.
29. Oslo II (note 21) p.38.
30. See Karin Aggestam, ‘From Theory to Practice: Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH)’, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 14/2 (2001) pp.53–69.
31. The Israeli Defense Forces and the Israeli Border Police are two different organizations. However, enlisted soldiers who fulfill their mandatory military service may be assigned to the Border Police. They are ranked as members of a ‘fighting unit’. Although the Jeep Commanders, also officially members of the Border Police, were drawn from the IDF, the DCO, RSC, and JSC were clearly defined units of the Israeli army. All of the security activity was under the ultimate authority of the Chief of Staff.
32. The Public Security Forces (*Amn al-mujtama*) – described to me by several Palestinian policemen as *Amn al-Am* – was a uniformed gendarmerie-type force, covering areas outside the cities. Part of its role was to preserve public order and to act against subversion. Public Security was also referred to as the National Security Forces and was sometimes seen as the ‘army’ or ‘National Guard’ of the PNA. It was the biggest of all the police branches, with an estimated strength of about 14,000, 6,000 in Gaza and 8,000 in the West Bank. Its members

were mainly drawn from PLA (Palestinian Liberation Army) forces that had been based in Jordan, Egypt and other Arab countries (cited from *Jane's Intelligence Review*, 5th Update (Croydon, UK: Jane's Information Group 1999)).

33. Other studies on security cooperation have been conducted in Germany, between the East and West German police (see Andreas Glaeser, *Divided in Unity: Identity, Germany and the Berlin Police* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press 2000)) and in Ireland between the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) of Northern Ireland and *An Garda Síochána* (AGS) of the Republic of Ireland (see Jason Lane, 'From Anglo-Irish Agreement to Good Friday 1998: A Lesson in Negotiated Order' (unpublished paper presented to the Open University European Centre for the Study of Policing Seminar 'Policing in Ireland': The Queen's University of Belfast 1999); Jason Lane, 'The Development of Irish Cross-Border Police Cooperation' (unpublished PhD Dissertation: Queens University, Belfast 1999)). The Glaeser study is 'an ethnography among police officers' and Lane examines the negotiated order between policemen in their daily informal relations. In neither case were the police forces attached to the military nor did they consist of soldiers in active military duty transferred to fulfill a peacekeeping role.
34. For the Israelis, the opportunity for non-mediated peacekeeping occurred during the Israel–Egypt Mixed Armistice Commission after the 1948 war (before there were UN peacekeeping forces) – but there was not joint patrolling. Thirty years later, between 1980–82, an unsupervised gap during the final Israeli withdrawal from Sinai left Israelis and Egyptians to fend for themselves to improvise. Egyptian and Israeli military forces jointly monitored the area from Ras Muhammad to the El Arish line in what was called Joint Patrols. The idea was then to be reapplied in Lebanon but the peace talks broke down. For the Palestinians, the concept of a Joint Patrol or 'Dawriyya Musharakah' also evolved between the PLO in Jordan and Lebanon. 1969–71, the PLO worked joint operations with the Jordanian army. After Black September (13 September 1970) and then the battle of Ajlun in April, 1971 the PLO re-based in Beirut. Around the summer of 1974, the Falangist Party made Joint Patrols manned by the PLO. During the 1993 negotiations and signing of the Declaration of Principles on 12 September 1993 Joint Patrolling was seen as a CBM. As the negotiators ironed out the subsequent Oslo Agreements they established non-mediated Joint Patrols as a well orchestrated quasi peacekeeping force.
35. Boutros-Boutros Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping* (New York: United Nations 1992, cited in Aggestam (note 30) p.56.
36. Victor Turner, 'Variations on a Theme of Liminality' in Sally Moore and Barara Myerhoff (eds.) *Secular Ritual* (Assen: Van Gorcum 1977) p.37.
37. Laura Miller and Charles Moskos, 'Humanitarians or Warriors?: Race, Gender and Combat Status in Operation Restore Hope', *Armed Forces & Society* 21/4 (1995) p.615.
38. See D. Heifetz-Yahav, *From Fighters to Peacekeepers: Negotiating Relations in the Israeli–Palestinian Joint Patrols* (unpublished Dissertation: Tel Aviv University 2002) where the idea of multiple hegemonic masculinities is applied to the daily negotiation of relations between 'men at work.'
39. Miller and Moskos (note 37).
40. Segal *et al.* express their concerns for the incompatibility 'between the parachutists' creed and the constabulary ethic' (David Segal, Jesse Harris, Joseph Rothberg, and David Marlowe, 'Paratroopers as Peacekeepers', *Armed Forces & Society* 10/4 (1984) p.505). On the other hand, Boas Shamir and Eyal Ben-Ari in their paper 'Leadership in an Open Army? Civilian Connections, Inter-organizational Frameworks and Changes in Military Leadership' (unpublished paper for the Symposium on 'Leadership Challenges of the Twenty-First Army': Hebrew University 1996) consider these changes or trends to reflect the following major themes: An 'opening' of the army, the blurring of the traditional borders between the military sphere and the civilian sphere and the related need to operate within inter-organizational frameworks involving other forces and non-military organizations. The haziness of professional and political boundaries enables the soldiers' emphasis to shift from fighting and winning wars to deterring conflict, ensuring the fulfillment of agreements, and performing tasks, such as mediating rival forces, normally reserved for constabulary forces.

41. Alan James, 'Politics in the UN System: The Issue of Peace and Security' (unpublished paper presented to the International Studies Association, Washington, DC).
42. See Aggestam's summary of first, second and third generation peacekeeping (note 30).
43. David Segal, Theodore Furukawa and Jerry Lindh, 'Light Infantry as Peacekeepers in the Sinai', *Armed Forces & Society* 16/3 (1990) p.387.
44. Laura Miller, 'Do Soldiers Hate Peacekeeping: The Case of Preventative Diplomacy Operations in Macedonia', *Armed Forces & Society* 23/3 (1997) p.427.
45. Indar Rikhye, Michael Hrbottle, Bjorn Egge, *The Thin Blue Line* (New Have, CT: Yale University Press 1974) cited in Jesse Harris and David Segal, 'Observations from the Sinai: The Boredom Factor', *Armed Forces & Society* 11/2 (1985) p.247.
46. Harris and Segal (note 45).
47. Joseph Rothberg, Jesse Harris, Linda Jellen and Richard Pickle, 'Illness and Health of the US Battalion in the Sinai MFO Deployment', *Armed Forces & Society* 11/3 (1985) pp.413–26.
48. Miller and Moskos (note 37).
49. Carol Cohn, 'Wars, Wimps, and Women: Talking Gendr and Thinking War' in M. Cooke and A. Woollacott (eds.) *Gendering War Talk* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1993) p.231.
50. Neta Crawford, 'The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships', *International Security* 24/4 (2000) pp.116–56.
51. The first day that I went into the field in September 1997, the Mental Health Officer escorting me told me the infamous story of the 'September Incident' – described later to me by Palestinians as the 'September Tunnel Incident.' It was the first of many stories, which would frame the lack of trustworthiness and professionalism that Israelis 'feared' in their Palestinian counterparts. Fifty-nine Palestinians and 14 Israelis were killed during the incident. The violence by Palestinians against the Israelis was precipitated by the Likud government's decision, lead by Benjamin Netanyahu, to open the then recently completed exit of the Hasmonian tunnel, despite warnings about its political and potentially explosive message of Jewish sovereignty over Jerusalem. Creating an exit to the 491-meter long ancient underpass beneath the Muslim Quarter ignited Palestinian riots and violence in Ramallah, which ricocheted over a period of three days throughout Gaza and the West Bank, escalating into a 'war.' The warriors were armed Palestinians in civilian clothes, the IDF, Palestinian policemen from various Palestinian security forces as well as the 'peacekeepers' engaged in security cooperation. Although, for the most part, the 'peacekeepers' did not necessarily shoot at each other, Israelis from the border police including a company commander were killed. The Israeli Security Forces had been warned of an impending social explosion should the Hasmonian Tunnel be opened. The incident created an upheaval and new protocol within the Israeli border police and impacted upon Palestinian operations. Concrete slabs were assembled to protect the Israeli DCO, bullet-proof vests were worn, Israeli jeeps were subsequently required to keep their doors shut and windows barred.
52. Arlie Hochschild, 'Emotion Work, Feeling Rules, and Social Structure', *American Journal of Sociology* 85/3 (1979) pp.551–75.
53. Alfred Schutz, 'On Multiple Realities', in *Collected Papers Vol.1* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1973[1945]).
54. *Kibbutz Galuyot* is a term to describe the ingathering of Jewish communities after the coming of the Messiah. It became an active principle of political Zionism for two essential reasons. While the Jewish ingathering would mark the end of an enforced Jewish Diaspora, it would also be essential to counterbalance the predominant indigenous Christian and Muslim populations. Only by bolstering the small indigenous Jewish minority through the ingathering of Jewish communities throughout the world could the Jewish State be re-established with a Jewish majority.
55. Joint Patrolmen would complete their eight-hour shift and serve on checkpoints or go out on general security missions, which they felt was their 'real' work as 'fighters.' Indeed, Israeli Border Police receive the name 'Fighters' from the Israeli Defense Forces and their pay scale is elevated accordingly. Thus, their 'real' work constitutes the practices of fighters. As such, they conduct operations where direct contact with Palestinian civilians may include breaking

into the homes of suspected ‘terrorists’ at night. In one instance, the Border Police and the Israeli army conducted a night raid into the home of a Palestinian Jeep officer of the Joint Patrols. He was handcuffed and left on the floor of his home for hours; this led to an investigation and apologies via the DCO. Border policemen may also be called to control public demonstrations. Thus, Israeli Border Police continue training as ‘fighters’ despite their antithetical role on the Joint Patrol.

56. In contrast, other members of Israel’s “National Minority” groups, such as the Bedouin, are not obliged but volunteer to serve in the Israeli Defense Forces.
57. Erving Goffman, *Asylums* (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin 1968).
58. Eviatar Zerubavel, *The Fine Line: Making Distinctions in Everyday Life* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press 1993 [1991]). p.90.
59. Haim Hazan, *The Limbo People: A Study of the Constitution of the Time Universe among the Aged* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1980).
60. Eyal Ben-Ari, ‘Masks and Soldiering: The Israeli Army and the Palestinian Uprising’, *Cultural Anthropology* 4/4 (1989) pp.372–89.
61. Eyal Ben-Ari, *Mastering Soldiers: Conflict, Emotions, and the Enemy in an Israeli Military Unit* (New York: Berghahn Books 1998)
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64. Frank Henderson Stewart, *Honor* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1994) p.54.
65. Stewart (note 64) p.55.
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68. Joint Mobile Units (JMU) were very similar in composition to the Joint Patrols. The primary distinction reflected Israel’s security sovereignty over Areas B and C. In Area B Palestinian civil police also had jurisdiction. In order for a Palestinian policeman to travel from Area A to B an Israeli jeep was required to escort. Personal relations often enabled the men to adapt to the mood in the field and either assuage or exacerbate the tensions in Area B. JMU were not strictly structured as were the JP. However, they were seen by the Palestinian to be the effective way towards the transition to a final peace agreement for both jeeps traveled together over much larger territory than the limited transversals of the JP.
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74. Arlie Hochschild, ‘The Sociology of Emotion as a Way of Seeing’, in Gillian Bendelow and Simon Williams (eds.) *Emotions in Social Life* (London and New York: Routledge 1998) p.10.
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